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The profound political intervention of feminism has been.., to redefine the very nature of what is deemed political.... The literary ramifications of this shift involve the discovery of the rhetorical survival skills of the
formerly unvoiced. Lies, secrets, silences, and deflections of all sorts are
routes taken by voices or messages not granted full legitimacy in order not
to be altogether lost.'

IN

1970 the Supreme Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly.'

The case,

which held that welfare recipients are entitled to an oral hearing prior
to having their benefits reduced or terminated, opened up a far-reaching
conversation among legal scholars over the meaning of procedural justice. All voices in this conversation endorse a normative floor that would
guarantee all persons the same formal opportunities to be heard in adjudicatory proceedings, regardless of such factors as race, gender, or class
identity. Beyond this minimal normative consensus, however, two groups
of scholars have very different visions of what procedural justice would
entail. One group, seeing procedure as an instrument of just government,
seeks devices that will most efficiently generate legitimate outcomes in a
complex society.' Other scholars, however, by taking the perspective of
society's marginalized groups, give voice to a very different-I will call it
1. B. Johnson, Is Writerliness Conservative?, in A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 25, 31 (1987).
2. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg was litigated as part of a broad initiative to increase the power
and expand the benefits of welfare recipients. See R. COVER, O. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 133
(1988). For more extensive discussion of the National Welfare Rights Organization's political strategy, see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED AND How
THEY FAIL 264-361 (1977); L. BAILIS, BREAD OR JUSTICE: GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1974) and sources cited therein.

3. This position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S, 319
(1976)(directing courts to balance accuracy, administrative costs, and other factors to determine the
minimal procedures constitutionally required before the state can infringe a liberty or property interest). Jerry Mashaw has criticized the logic of the Matthews decision in The Supreme Court's Due
Process CalculusforAdministrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge! Three Factors in Search of

a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976). Yet it is Mashaw who has most fully articulated a
vision of process as an instrument ofjust government in a bureaucratic state. See J. MASHAW, DUE
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). See also his pre-Matthews article, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy,
Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772

(1974).
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a "humanist"-vision. According to this vision, "procedural justice" is a
normative horizon rather than a technical problem. This horizon challenges us to realize the promise of formal procedural equality in the real
world. But this horizon may beckon us even farther than equality of access to current adjudicatory rituals. It may invite us to create new legal
and political institutions that will frame "stronger," more meaningful opportunities for participation 4 than we can imagine within a bureaucratic
state.' Goldberg can be read to pre-figure this humanist vision of procedural justice. The Court's decision to mandate prior oral hearings for
welfare recipients suggests "the Nation's basic commitment" to both substantive equality and institutional innovation in participation opportuni-

ties, in order to "foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders." 6
I begin this essay by assuming that the meaningful participation by
all citizens in the governmental decisions that affect their lives-that is,
the humanist vision-reflects a normatively compelling and widely
shared intuition about procedural justice in our political culture.7 The
4. See B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984).
5. Prominent among the legal scholars engaged in articulating this vision of process are Martha
Minow and Frank Michelman. See, eg., Minow, InterpretingRights: an Essayfor Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Minow, The Supreme Court 1987 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Michelman, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Michelman, Formaland AssociationalAimsin ProceduralDue Process, in NoMos, DUE PROCESS 126 (J.
Pennock & J.Chapman eds. 1977); Michelman,
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J.
1153.
6. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 2, at 264-65 (emphasis added). It is ironic that the Goldberg
opinion itself fits best within the instrumentalist conversation about procedural values. Justice Brennan endorses oral pre-termination hearings for welfare recipients primarily because he assumes that
such hearings will ensure accurate and politically legitimate decisions. Scholars from all political
perspectives have raised questions about whether welfare hearings have in fact fulfilled those instrumental objectives, or otherwise increased the power of the poor. See, eg., Scott, The Reality of
Procedural Due Process - A Study of the Implementation of FairHearing Requirements by the
Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1972) (empirical study of the implementation of
fair hearings in Virginia welfare offices); Mashaw, The ManagementSide of Due Process, supra note
3 (questioning the efficiency of individualized welfare hearings in every context); Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy,and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983)(statistics show that hearing
opportunities are rarely used by unrepresented clients). See also Gabel & Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 369 (1982); Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlements and Welfare Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY (1986); Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.

REV. 1431 (1986) (all raising questions about how effective procedural reforms have been in expanding the substantive entitlements or political power of the poor).
7. Studies by social scientist Tom Tyler suggest that one of the major factors that determine the
degree of fairness that a litigant perceives in a procedure is her opportunity for participation. See
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essay explores a disjuncture between this vision and the conditions in our
society in which procedural rituals are actually played out. Familiar cultural images and long-established legal norms construct the subjectivity
and speech of socially subordinated persons as inherently inferior to the

speech and personhood of dominant groups. Social subordination itself
can lead disfavored groups to deploy verbal strategies that mark their

speech as deviant when measured against dominant stylistic norms.
These conditions-the web of subterranean speech norms and coerced
speech practices that accompany race, gender, and class domination 8- -

undermine the capacity of many persons in our society to use the
procedural rituals that are formally available to them. Furthermore, bu-

reaucratic institutions disable all citizens--especially those from
subordinated social groups-from meaningful participation in their own
political lives.
This disjuncture between the norm of at least equal-if not also
meaningful-participation opportunities for all citizens and a deeply
stratified social reality reveals itself when subordinated speakers attempt
to use the procedures that the system affords them. The essay tells the
story of such an attempt-a story of enforced silence, rhetorical survival,
and chance, as a poor woman engages in an administrative hearing at a
welfare office. I tell the story more as a meditation than an argument-a
Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 103 (1988). See also, Tyler, The Role ofPerceivedInjustice in Defend.
ant's Evaluationsoftheir Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51 (1984); J. THIBAUT & L.
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). See also O'Neil, Of Justice
Denied: The Welfare PriorHearing Cases, 1970 SuP. Cr. REV. 161, 187 n. 129 ("[tjhe hearing...
serves a psychological need in the administration of benefit programs that may be even more basic to
a civilized system of administration than the function of ascertaining the truth.").
8. In this essay I use "gender, race, and class" not to denote physical traits of individuals, but
rather to refer to schema of shared meaning that construct and support social hierarchy by reifying
and ranking human differences. Thus, the very concepts of gender, race, and class are inextricably
bound up with norms that construct and sustain subordination. Albert Memmi describes the process
of race classification as follows:
Racism is the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary differences, to
the accuser's benefit and at his victim's expense, in order to justify the former's own
privileges or aggression.... Broadly speaking, the process is one ofgradualdehumanization. The racist ascribes to his victim a series of surprising traits, calling him incomprehensible, impenetrable, mysterious, strange, disturbing, etc. Slowly he makes of his
victim a sort of animal, a thing or simply a symbol.
A. MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN 191-95 (1968). Catharine MacKinnon explains the concept of gender: "Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination. . . . [D]ifferences were demarcated, together with social systems to exaggerate them in
perception and in fact, because the systematically differential delivery of benefits and deprivations
required making no mistake about who was who." C. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On

Sex Discrimination,in

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED

32, 40 (1987).
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meditation on the conditions that undermine the humanist project of
procedural justice in our present society and the changes that might
bring us closer to realizing that vision in the future.
The essay has two parts. In the introductory section, I briefly describe three ways that gender, race, and class subordination have been
expressed in our culture through speech norms and language practices. I
begin by pointing to stereotypical images of woman's speech, to give one
example of how the voices of subordinated groups are often constructed
by the dominant culture as deviant or dangerous. I then briefly trace how
legal doctrine has reflected and validated such negative stereotypes by
excluding the speech of subordinated groups from legal rituals altogether, or by systematically devaluing their speech. Finally, I survey recent research in linguistics and anthropology which suggests that when
socially subordinated groups gain formal access to legal rituals, they are
often perceived-and indeed may feel compelled-to speak in ways that
invite dominant speakers to dismiss or devalue what they say.
These three themes of socially constructed deviance in the speech of
subordinated groups provide a setting for the essay's central project-a
story of how "Mrs. G.," a woman subordinated by race, gender, and
class, attempts to make herself heard in an administrative hearing. After
telling the story, I interpret it. First, I survey the local landscape of her
hearing, identifying three barriers that obstruct her participation, even
though the formal legal obstacles have been removed. I suggest that these
local barriers are erected on the deep foundation of overtly racist and
gendered speech norms that I have pointed to in the introduction. At the
same time, these barriers are concrete expressions of on-going race, gender, and class subordination. I then offer my own reading of the story,
tracing how Mrs. G.-guided by distrust, impulsiveness, and luck-managed to maneuver around these barriers, more or less. I close by asking
what legal and social reforms might give Mrs. G. a fairer, more meaningful opportunity to participate in the governmental decisions that shape
her life. Although I do not offer a definitive answer to that question, I
suggest that the commitments that might realize a humanist vision of
proceduraljustice converge with commitments our society has repeatedly
considered-and sometimes haltingly undertaken-to redress deeply
rooted substantive inequalities.
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THE SHAPING OF SUBORDINATE SPEECH

Ancient Images: Dangerous,Seductive Voices 9

A recurring theme in our cultural imagery of gender is the privi-

leged status of men to speak.10 The very term for the male sex organ,
"testis," is linked etymologically to the root for "testimony" and "testify"-bearing witness, reliably, truthfully, authoritatively, in the public
realm, about events in the world. 1 Thus, the concepts of maleness and

witnessing are linked in the very language we use: in the deep logic of our

lexical system, 2 to be a "real" witness one must, quite literally, have
balls.
In contrast to this concept of the male as witness, the concept Wo9. In this section, I draw on familiar misogynist imagery to suggest that systemic subordination
is often expressed through deep-and perhaps even subconscious-assumptions that the disfavored
group has deviant capacities for human speech. Because of the close link between language capacity
and our concepts of personhood, it may be that all subordinating ideologies presume that the
stigmatized group has an inferior or deviant capacity for speech. This section points toward that
conclusion, but does not attempt to document it comprehensively across different subordinating
ideologies. In reading this section, the reader must be aware of the problems inherent in abstracting
one dimension of subordination, such as gender, from the complex experience of subordination in
real lives. For perceptive discussion of those problems, see, eg., E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION INFEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex A Black Feminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; B. Hooks, Racism and Feminism: The
Issue of Accountability, in AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 119-158 (1981); A.
Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114-123
(1984); A. Rich, Notes Toward a Politics of Location, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY 210-232
(1986).
10. Catharine MacKinnon summarizes the recurring insight of a wide range of feminists when
she notes that "[a]nyone who is the least bit attentive to gender since reading Simone de Beauvoir
knows that it is men socially who are subjects.... Thus the one who has the social access to being
that self which takes the stance that is allowed to be objective.., is socially male." See C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 55.
11. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "testify" as "to make a solemn declaration,
under oath or affirmation, in a judicial inquiry, for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
Id. at 1323. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Modern English term "testis" has been
assumed to have an etymological identity with the Latin term "testis," which meant witness. 17
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 834 (2d ed. 1989). Though there is some dispute about this connection, the identity has been assumed throughout Western history, as evidenced by the sixteenth century usage of the French term "tesmoign" to refer to both the male sex organ and a witness in a
court proceeding.
12. Both historical linguists and feminist theorists claim that the full significance that any concept conveys in a living language reflects the historical process through which that cluster of current
meanings evolved. Therefore, one of the most fruitful approaches to the understanding of a semantic
system is through the reconstruction of the etymologies of the words in it. See, e.g., M. DALY,
WEBSTER'S FIRST NEw INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1987); A.
MEILLET, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS (G. Ford trans. 1967); M.
BREAL, SEMANTICS: STUDIES IN THE SCIENCE OF MEANING

(N.

Cust

trans. 1964).
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man has traditionally connoted a very different kind of speaker and a
very different quality of speech. Although they have documented many
variances, anthropologists studying cultural imagery of women have
noted a characteristic polarity. 13 Some have called this pattern the "pedestal-gutter syndrome"1 4 or "idealization and disparagement."1 5 Woman
is portrayed, often in a single embodiment, to be both a goddess and a
slut. In sharp contrast to the authoritative speech of the male, Woman's
speech cannot be trusted, in either of her contradictory personae. As goddess, Woman's voice cannot be trusted because it is "indecidable." Refusing to conform to the binary logic of male language, the voice of the
goddess poses a threat to the entire "phallologocentric" regime.1 6 And as
the whore, Woman's voice cannot be trusted because her words have
been purchased and they therefore conceal her real passions and her real
designs.17 Thus, Woman's speech is not reliable, like the male's. Rather,
at best she is a mystery, "covered by a veil .. of beautiful possibilities,
sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity, and seduction." 18 More typically, however, the image of Woman's voice has
aroused deep fear and hatred, as John Lyly, an Elizabethan playwright
and rhetorician, expressed in a stylized misogynist tirade:
Take from them their periwiggs, their payntings, their lewells, their rowles,
their boulsterings ... then will they appeare so odious, so vgly, so monstrous, yet thou will rather thinke them Serpents than Saynts, & so lyke
Hags, that thou wilt feare rather to be enchanted than enamoured. 19
13. See, e.g., Ruble & Ruble, Sex Stereotyping, in IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN STEREOTYPING 188, 190 (A. Miller ed. 1982).
14. C. TRAVIS & C. OFFIR, THE LONGEST WAR (1977).
15.

J. WILLIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: BEHAVIOR IN A BIOSOCIAL CONTEXT (1987).

16. Some feminist philosophers have made the sweeping argument that the form of logic
through which knowledge has been articulated in male-dominated, or "phallologocentric" European
civilization presumes gender domination, the denial of the bodily experience and language capacity
of women, in order to conceal its own internal contradictions. Elaboration of this provocative but
complex argument is beyond the scope of this essay. See, e.g., L. IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE
OTHER WOMAN (G. Gill trans. 1974); L. IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (C. Porter trans.
1985); J. DERRIDA, SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES (B. Harlow trans. 1979). For relatively accessible

commentary and critique of this literature, see, eg., T. Moi, SEXUAL/TEXTUAL POLITICS - FEMINIST LITERARY THEORY (1985); J. Culler, Reading as a Woman, in ON DECONSTRUCTION 43-64
(1982); E. Grosz, Three French Feminists (forthcoming); Fraser, The Uses and Abuses of French
Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics (1989)(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
17.

A. DWORKIN, WOMAN-HATING: A RADICAL LOOK AT SEXUALITY 29-46 (1974).

18.

F. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 272 (W. Kaufman trans. 1974).

19. J. LYLY,

Euphues, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN LYLY 254-55 (R. Bond ed. 1902),

cited by S. GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER (1978), at 12-13, quoting
K. ROGERS, THE TROUBLESOME HELPMATE 111 (1966). Such misogynist tirades became one of the

typical vehicles through which Renaissance rhetoricians throughout Western Europe practiced their

8
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The unsettling imagery of Woman's voice is linked to the social subordination of real women in a complex, circular dynamic. Cultural
images that construct Woman's voice as dangerous and fearful rationalize the social control of real women. Yet at the same time these misogynist stereotypes describe social reality; they point to qualities that real
women-precisely because of their subordinate status-have been forced
to learn. 20 Women cannot afford to speak with candor-or even to perceive what it is that they really feel-because the threat of male violence

has taught them to shape what they say by the way in which they read
male pleasure, if they want to survive.2 '

Some feminists insist that this "mirroring" is the only social role
that women can play.22 Yet these theorists underestimate the capacity of
human speech. Contrary to their analysis, women's social subordination
can never reduce them to silence. For even in their most apparently doc-

ile moments, when their words seem most obedient to what men want,
women-because they retain the power of speech-can find in the very
ambiguity of the language they use the means to mock their masters,
challenging the hegemony of the male regime.2 a Every word that they
speak, every silence, carries the risk of subversion, of a double meaning
verbal craft. See P. Parker, LITERARY FAT LADIES: RHETORIC, GENDER, PROPERTY 8 (1987)(interpreting misogynist representations of Woman's voice in Renaissance literary and rhetorical texts).
20. Nietzsche states the logic in an aphorism: "Reflect on the whole history of women: do they
not have to be first of all and above all else actresses?" See NIETZSCHE supra note 18, at 317.
21. For feminist analyses of how the pervasive threat of male violence has shaped the identity of
Woman, see West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A PhenomenologicalCritiqueof Feral.
nist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 87, 94 (1987)(".. .[o]ne responds to pervasive fear and
pervasive threat not by changing one's behavior, but by re-defining oneself .. . A fully justified fear
[of the violent nature of male sexuality] ... permeates many women's - perhaps all women's sexual and emotional self-definition. Women respond to the fear by re-constituting themselves in a
way that controls the danger and suppresses the fear.") (emphasis in original); and MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 528-30 (1982).
22. See V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 35-36 (1969)quoted in MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 645 & n.18
(1983)("Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious
power ... of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size.... [Whatever may be their use in
civilized societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic action. That is why Napoleon and
Mussolini both insist so emphatically upon the inferiority of women, for if they were not inferior,
they would cease to enlarge.").
23. Patricia Yaeger is among the group of recent feminist critics and linguists who explore the
emancipatory potential in human language capacity that no repressive cultural system can fully extinguish. "[L]anguage is both constraint and means of emancipation or action.... [Speech] enact[s]
the repressions of the dominant culture, [but] . . . can also deflect and begin to reconstruct the
dominant culture's direction." P. YAEGER, HONEY-MAD WOMEN: EMANCIPATORY STRATEGIES IN
WOMEN'S WRITING 111 (1988). See also D. CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUIST THEORY (1985).
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that those in power can never fully understand.2 4 Thus the repression of
women in the social world, rather than alleviating the misogynist fear of
Woman's voice, actually fuels that fear, thereby rationalizing further
measures of social control.
B. Archaic Laws: Keeping SubordinatesSilent 2"
The law governing the use of speech in legal rituals-the law of evidence-has devised an arsenal of doctrines for guarding against the
voices of women and other subordinate groups. The most common device has been the outright exclusion of testimony from the members of
stigmatized groups. Prior to the Civil War, most states had statutes
which forbade peoples of color2 6 from testifying against whites in courts
of law. These statutes did not necessarily bar the targeted groups from
testifying in matters involving other members of the same group. Rather,
they often applied only when the hierarchy of caste might be threatened:
when the speech of a Black, for instance, mighf prejudice the interests of
7
a white.1
When these statutes were challenged, the courts sometimes spelled
24. A recurring fear of the master is that the slaves will devise a private language through which
they will plot their escape - or his murder - in his uncomprehending presence. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION: AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN WORLD (1981).

Recent minority legal scholars have emphasized this threat that subordinated peoples always pose
to their dominators. See, e.g., Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdealsfrom Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 435 (1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of CriticalLegal
Theory for People of Color, 5 LAw & INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 103

(1987).
25. In this section I do not seek to pronounce a last word on these issues. Rather, by surveying
some materials and asking many questions, I seek to open up new paths of inquiry.
26. The excluded groups were generally African Americans, Native Americans, people of mixed
race, and sometimes Asians.
27. The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts attempted to remedy this problem by giving Blacks
the explicit right to "sue, be parties, give evidence" on the same basis as whites. See Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, and Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144, both
presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It was not until these provisions were enforced by court
decisions, however, that the formerly slave-holding states changed their practice. See The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883).
Thus, as late as 1865, after the Civil War, Kentucky enacted a law that provided that "Negroes
and mulattoes shall [only] be competent witnesses in all criminal proceedings where a negro or
mulatto is a defendant" or a civil proceeding in which the only parties in interest are negroes or
mulattoes. See Act of Feb. 14, 1866, ch. 563, 1865 Ky. Acts 38, quoted in Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a JurisdictionalTheme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 483 & n.51 (analyzing Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. 581 (1883)). See also 50 AM. DIGEsT Competency ofNegroes in General § 107, 16581896 (1904).
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out the underlying assumptionsabout the speech of peoples of color
which rationalized them. People v. Hall28 is an example. It concerns the
trial of three whites for the murder of a Chinese man in California in the
1850s. The testimony of three Chinese was admitted against the defendants. The trial court convicted Hall and sentenced him to be hanged. On
appeal the issue was whether a statute which barred Blacks and Indians
from giving testimony against whites29 should be read to bar Chinese
witnesses as well.
The court, extending the statute to bar the testimony of the Chinese
witnesses, reversed Hall's conviction. In its opinion, it set out the basis
for the exclusion:
[it would be an] anomalous spectacle.. .[if a] distinct people... whose
mendacity is proverbial, a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a
certain point, as their history has shown; differing in language, opinions,
color, and physical confirmation; between whom and ourselves nature has
placed an impassable difference, is now presented, and for them is claimed,
not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen, but the further priviwith us in administering the affairs of our
lege of participating
30
government.

In this racist vision, non-whites were imagined to be so radically
deviant in their essential nature, 3 ' that it was unthinkable to allow them
to speak out on matters that might affect whites. No harm would follow
if they were allowed to speak among their own kind in their strange
primitive languages. But their talk must not command any power in the
world of white people. Thus, competency doctrine both rationalized and
28. The People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854). The case is discussed in McClain, The ChineseStruggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV.
529, 548-53 (1984).
29. The statute at issue provided that "No Black, or Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed
to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man." Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, § 14, 1850 Cal.
Stat. 229, 230, amended by Act of Mar. 18, 1863, ch. 70, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69, repealed by omission
from codification CAL. PENAL CODE § 1321 (1872)(officially repealed, Act of Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 48,
§ 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 488, 489). A parallel provision, "No Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify
as a witness in any action in which a white person is a party", applied to civil cases. Civil Practice
Act of 1851, ch. 5, § 394(3), 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 114, amended by Act of Mar. 16, 1863, ch. 68, 1863
Cal. Stat. 60, repealed by omission from codification CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 8, 1880 (1872)(offlcially repealed, Act of Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 33, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 475), cited in People v. Hall, supra
note 28, at 399, McClain, supra note 28, at 549 & n. 113.
30. People v. Hall, supra note 28, at 405.
31. For a discussion of the history of the depiction of peoples of color as sub-human, bestial, and
lacking in fully human capacities of speech, see Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy
of the Myth of the Dark Continent, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 185-222 (H. Gates ed.
1986).
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helped to stabilize a caste system. The doctrine tried to justify the exploitation of Africans and Asians by spreading the myth-belied by
widespread sexual and economic interconnection-that these groups inhabited a lower, self-enclosed social world. At the same time, the exclusion of their testimony against whites helped make it easier for the
dominant group to use violence against their subordinates without risking legal sanctions.
The law has also categorically excluded the speech of women from
legal rituals, but in the more remote past. In medieval civil and canon
law jurisdictions on the European continent, wholesale exclusion of women's testimony was the rule until roughly the fourteenth century. 32 This

policy was justified by ancient maxims about woman's nature, such as
Virgil's "Varium et mutabile semper femina" 33 and the admonition from
Talmudic Law that the testimony of women should not be received "on
account of the levity and audacity of their sex."' 34 Even after categorical
exclusions were removed, rules remained in effect in civil law jurisdictions well into the nineteenth century that explicitly weighted the testi-

mony of women less heavily than that of men.3
From its origins, the common law system forbade women from initiating lawsuits except in limited circumstances that were tied to the marriage relationship. 36 The status of women as witnesses was more
complex. The doctrine of competency had its origin in religious beliefs
32.

See W. BEST, I THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 84-85 (1875).

33. "Fickle and always changing is woman." VIRGIL, 4 AENEID 569-70.
34. Joseph. Antiq. Judaid. lib. 4, c. 8, No. 15, cited in BEST, supra note 32, at 85. Best's own
evaluation is that this rendering'is probably "apocryphal". For a modern discussion of the status of
women in Talmudic law, see Hauptman, Images of Women in the Talmud, in RELIGION AND SEXISM: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS 184, 194 (R. Ruether ed.
1974)("[A] woman was excluded from giving testimony in most cases and from serving as a judge.
... [S]ome apologists explain this exclusion in terms of women being too emotional, and therefore
unable to testify with objectivity."); B. GREENBERG, ON WOMEN & JUDAISM: A VIEW FROM TRADITION 57-73 (1981). These attitudes carried over into the Christian tradition. See, e.g., "Let your
women keep silence in the churches: ... for it is a shame for women to speak in the church" (I
Corinthians 14:34-35); and "Let the woman learn in silence with all subjugation. But, I suffer not a
woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence." (I Timothy 2:11-2:12).
See also S. Bern & D. Bem, Training the Woman to Know Her Place, in BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND
HUMAN AFFAIRS 97 (D. Bem ed. 1970).
35. For example, in Berne as late as 1821, the deposition of three women was only equal to that
of two men. In the Swiss Canton of Vaud as late as 1824, the testimony of two women was required
to counterbalance that of one man. Best, supra note 32, at 86.
36. The Magna Carta prevented women from initiating capital prosecutions against men, with a
limited exception linked to marriage. See The Magna Carta, Clause 54 ("No man shall be arrested
or imprisoned upon appeal [i.e., information, private prosecution] of a woman for the death of anyone except her husband."). Steven Yeazell pointed out this provision to me.
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about what persons could swear an oath to serve as jurors. Women were

not among this group.3 7 After the functions of witness and juror were
differentiated in the fourteenth century, a common law of witness compe-

se,
tency evolved.3" Although women were not barred from testifying per
39 It
circumstances.
many
in
evidence
giving
from
forbidden
they were
was not until the eighteenth century that women's testimony was consistently admitted in criminal cases. 4° And it was not until the mid-nineteenth century, when the common law doctrine of coverture was relaxed
by the married women's property acts,4 ' that wives were permitted to

testify in cases in which their husbands were parties.42
37. See generally, Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482 (1939). In this
early stage, the functions of witness and juror were combined; women were excluded in both capacities. After jurors and witnesses were differentiated in the fourteenth century, women were allowed to
give testimony in some circumstances. See Thayer, The Jury andIts Development, 5 HARV. L. REV.
249 (1892). Women were not allowed on juries in the United States, however, until the early twentieth century. See Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in R. COVER, 0. FIss, & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE
1167 (1988) (short story published in 1917 advocating the inclusion of women on juries); Weisbrod,
Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986).
38. At various times, categorically "incompetent" groups have included children, Jews, heretics
and pagans, slaves, the blind, the deaf and dumb, imbeciles and the insane, and poor people. See
Rowley, supra note 37, at 488; 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (1938).
39. For instance, according to Sir Edward Coke, women were prevented from offering testimony that might affect certain status or property relations of men. See E. COKE, 1 THE FIRST PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON,

L.1 C.1.

§ 1.6.b. (F. Hargrave & C. Butler eds. 1823)(women forbidden from offering testimony "to prove a
man to be a villeine" or to prove that a man had male issue born alive). Villeinage refers to that class
in medieval society which did not hold land in their own right, but were tenants bound to the service
of the king.
40. BEST, supranote 32, at 79 cites several Scottish sources on this point. See, e.g., J. BURNETT,
A TREATISE ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 388-90 (1811). Burnett explains that the total exclusion of women from giving testimony was "a rule borrowed from the
laws of the church, and.., seems to have been founded more on a regard to female delicacy, and the
supposed indecorum of women appearing in Courts of Justice, than upon any notion of their being
less qualified to give testimony than persons of the other sex." Id. at 388. Burnett explains that by
the eighteenth century the rule had been greatly relaxed in certain areas, but not in cases of murder
or theft unless no male witnesses were available. Burnett was quite critical of the exclusion of women's testimony. He based his position on an idealization of the feminine: "women are in general
most distinct witnesses ... from their habits and temper, more apt to be strongly impressed with
occurrences which pass before them, and consequently more accurate in their recollection of them."
Id. at 390.
41. Under the common law doctrine of coverture, married women could not own property or
bring litigation in their own right. Coverture was reformed in most American jurisdictions by the
mid-nineteenth century. See 50 AM. DIGEST Statutory Removal of Disqualification§ 166 1658-1896
(1904); Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U.S. 650, 683 (1889)(applying Illinois Statute allowing married
persons to testify for and against each other in cases involving the separate property of the wife).
42. See Rowley, supra note 37, at 489. See also 2 J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 600 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). The rationale for the exclusion of wives' testimony in such cases was that
the legitimate legal interests of married women were identical to those of their husbands. Further-
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These glimpses into the history of competency doctrine suggest that
race, gender and property have shaped the doctrine, but in complex
ways. In many cases the exclusion of women's testimony reflected an
image of Woman as an unreliable speaker. But an idealized image of Woman was also at play, a picture of a creature too delicate to withstand the
ugliness of the public sphere. Furthermore, the substance of the case
seemed a crucial factor in the admission or exclusion of women as witnesses. On some issues, such as the political or economic status of males,
her voice seemed especially out of place. The treatises do not give a clue
to the social reality, however. It may be that in certain settings, women
witnesses commanded considerable de facto authority.4 3 Much more research is needed to ascertain and interpret the patterns of formal exclusion of subordinated groups in court, and the means by which they
overcame or evaded those barriers.
By the late nineteenth century, categorical notions of competency
began to give way to the current "rational" approach, which requires
individualized scrutiny of the potential witness based on established criteria of "reliable" speech. The witness must be able to perceive and remember accurately; he must have an actual recollection of the events in
question; he must be able to distinguish between truth and falsehood; and
he must be able to express himself clearly.' Under these criteria, the
paradigm of the competent witness is a speaker who can disregard the
listener, presume his own objectivity, and make pronouncements about
the state of the world. As the next section demonstrates, this paradigm
correlates with the typical language habits of socially privileged speakers;
its effect is to transform the speech style of the dominant group into the
norm against which the value of all testimony is assessed,45 and to shift
the exclusion of subordinate voices from the domain of formal exclusionary doctrines to that of discretionary judgments about the value-the
credibility-of the speech.4 6
more, it was feared that either the woman's affection for her husband would bias her testimony, or
that her testimony would disrupt family harmony.
43. For instance, research by Hendrik Hartog into civil court records of Middlesex County,
Massachusetts in the eighteenth century revealed that in cases of "bastardy" the midwife who delivered the child was privileged to give conclusive testimony on the question of paternity. Conversation
with Hendrik Hartog (May 1988).
44. See FED. R. OF EVID. 601-03.
45. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
46. One might note that the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as prominent commentators,
recommend that the a priori exclusion of witnesses based on mental or moral qualifications should be
eliminated entirely, and the factfinder should be charged to consider the indicia of competency in
assessing the weight and credibility of witness speech. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTE TO
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Verbal Strategies:Hedges and Mirrors
Linguists have repeatedly noted significant differences between the

speech of dominant and subordinated groups within the same broad language communities. Particularly in the context of gender, such differences, both in language practice and in beliefs about how men and
women speak,4' have been documented across many cultures.48 In an
influential essay published in 1975, linguist Robin Lakoff asked why men
49
and women are often presumed-and observed-to speak differently.
In seeking an answer to this question, she suggested that the speech of

men and women might be motivated by two contrasting goals, the
"transmission of factual knowledge" and "politeness," which correspond

to two contrasting verbal styles.
Lakoff links the first of these styles to the typical speech habits of
men. In this style, the speaker's primary goal is to inform the listener of
new information "by the least circuitous route."50 The speaker will use
succinct, unambiguous, declarative sentences-unqualified factual pro-

positions ordered according to a linear logic. 51 These features convey the
speaker's authority. They announce his autonomous power to make
truthful statements about the world.
Lakoff claims that a contrasting "polite" style, crafted to sustain
FED. R. EVID. 601 ("A witness wholly without capacity is difficult to imagine. The question is one
particularly suited to the jury as one of weight and credibility ....
"); 2 J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE
§ 509 Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
47. Folk-linguistics explores how people believe that they and others in their language community speak. See Hoenigswald, A Proposalfor the Study of Folk-linguistics, in SOCIOLINGUISTICS 16
(W. Bright ed. 1966).
48. Major works of feminist linguistic scholarship from the last two decades include D. CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY (1985); LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SOCIETY (B.

Thorne, C. Kramarae & N. Henley eds. 1983); C. KRAMARAE, WOMEN AND MEN SPEAKING
(1981); WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SOCIETY (S. McConnell-Ginet, R. Borker &
N. Furman eds. 1980); M. KEY,MALE/FEMALE LANGUAGE (1975); and LANGUAGE AND SEX:
DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE (B. Thorne & N. Henley eds. 1975). For an overview and critique of
feminist linguistic investigation, see Elshtain, Feminist Discourse and its Discontents, in FEMINIST
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 127-145 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi eds. 1981), and
McConnell-Ginet, Difference and Language: A Linguist's Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE 156-166 (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds., 1987). For a survey of linguistic data about gendered
features in non-Western languages, see Bodine, Sex Differentiationin Language, in LANGUAGE AND
SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE 130 (B. Thorne & N. Henley eds. 1975).
49. R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975). Lakoff based her conclusions on
introspection and intuition about the speech of white, middle class professional women like herself,

rather than on rigorous field studies. Id. at 4 ("I have examined my own speech and that of my
acquaintances, and have used my own intuitions in analyzing it.").
50. Id. at 71.
51.

See id. In characterizing this style, Lakoff draws heavily from H. P. GRICE, THE LOGIC OF
(1968).
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connection with the listener, typifies the speech of women. Polite speech
does not announce the speaker's own authority; rather, it enacts her deference to her listener and garners "some intuition about his feelings toward [her]." 52 The "polite" speaker gives her listener great linguistic
latitude to determine what she, the speaker, means to say. She does so by
adding features to declarative sentences that render them ambiguous.
These "hedges," as Lakoff calls them,53 include a rising, questioning intonation, "tag questions,"5 4 excessive modals or hyper-polite circumlocutions,5" and semantically ambiguous adjectives or intensifiers. 6 All of
these hedges undercut the claim to authority that is implicit in declarative syntax. They cede to the listener the power to determine what the

speaker has to say.
Lakoff's essay has stimulated a vast literature of responses.17 Some
of her critics dispute Lakoff's negative evaluation of women's language.5
These critics seek in women's speech habits a powerful utopian alternative to male language and male logic.5 9 Other critics have begun to docu52. LAKOFF, supra note 49, at 70.
53. Id. at 53.
54. For example, "It's time for dinner, isn't it?"
55. For example, "Wouldn't it be a good idea if you could leave me alone."
56. For example, "That seemed kinda all right."
57. Virtually every linguistic and political claim of Lakofts has stimulated further research. The
technical studies include Brend, Male-Female Intonation Patterns in American English, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE, supra note 48, at 84-87, and B. PREISLER, LINGUISTIC SEX ROLES IN CONVERSATION: SOCIAL VARIATION IN THE EXPRESSION OF

TENTATIVENESS IN ENGLISH (1986). For a broad critique of Lakoff's method and conclusions, see
Kramerae, Women's Speech: Separate but Unequal? in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND
DOMINANCE, supra note 48, at 43-56. For a comprehensive bibliography of the linguistics literature
scrutinizing Lakoff's claims, see LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SOCIETY, supra note 48, at 233-252
(annotated bibliography of linguistic works exploring "Sex Differences and Similarities in Language
Use: Linguistic Components").
58. See, e.g., B. Thorne & N. Henley, Difference and Dominance: An Overview of Language,
Gender, and Society, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE, supranote 48, at 2526 ("[Ajlthough stressing the primacy of social rather than linguistic change, Lakoff seems to argue
that equality should entail women using the 'stronger' forms now associated with men.") (emphasis
in original)).
59. These critics argue that women's speech can show us how to use language to negotiate truly
human meanings, which are inescapably ambivalent, by attending to the Other, rather than by imposing an imperial truth on a captive audience. Furthermore, they claim that it is only by revaluing
women's language, culture, and life experience that we can talk concretely about what norms and
visions should motivate the feminist political project in the long term. See, e.g., Kramerae, Women's
Speech: Separate but Unequal supra note 48, at 43-56; Fishman, Interaction: The Work Women Do,
in LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SOCIETY, supra note 48, at 89.

Lakoff's critics are correct to remind us that feminists must debate ultimate visions. However, at
the same time we must make hard decisions about the concrete steps that might lead forward. It is to
this "transitional" question that Lakoff speaks when she suggests that women should learn to speak
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ment the speech strategies of the economically and racially subordinated
women who were excluded from Lakoff's sample.60 Their work suggests
that "women's language" is best understood as the array of speech strategies that women-as well as other subordinated speakers-have devised

to manage verbal encounters with more powerful Others. The common
variable in these encounters is not the speaker's gender identity. Rather,
it is the imbalance between two speakers in social power.
The work of legal anthropologist William O'Barr lends support to
this broad thesis.6 1 In observing courtroom testimony, he found that wo-

men are more likely than men to use the verbal features that Lakoff labels "women's language."'6 2 Yet these features correlate more strongly
with the speaker's social status than with gender per se.6 3 Based on this
like males if they want to command power in the present-day public world. In her view, because
dominant-group males control the public sphere, setting the standards for public discourse, women's
verbal hedges are heard as confessions of their lack of power. This debate between Lakoff and her
critics is but one example of a broader discussion among feminists about whether the historical
practices of women should be regarded as symptoms of gender oppression or lauded as the signifiers
of alternative feminist values. For an exposition of this debate, see Feminist Discourse,Moral Values,
and the Law - a Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11 (1985). For discussion of the problem of
"transition" in feminist politics, see Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987);
Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problemsof Transition:New Perspectiveson Battered Women,
1989, 23 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (exploring the dilemma for feminists of choosing political tactics that
will be effective in the present-day world without thereby reinforcing the dominant norms that one
ultimately seeks to change).
60. See the essays in LANGUAGE AND POWER (C. Kramarae, M. Schulz & W. O'Barr eds.
1984). See also Nichols, Women in their Speech Communities, in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN
LITERATURE AND SOCIETY, supra note 48, at 140 (documenting contrasts between women speakers
in different speech communities and conversational settings, which the author relates to such variables as social role and activities); Nichols, Linguistic Options and Choicesfor Black Women in the
Rural South, in LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SOCIETY, supra note 48, at 54; Scott, The English Language andBlack Womanhood: a Low Blow at Self-esteem, 2 J. AFRO-AMERICAN ISSUES 218 (1974);
Stanback, LanguageandBlack Woman's Place: Towards a DescriptionofBlack Women's Communication (paper presented at meeting of Speech Communication Association, Lousiville, Ky., 1982).
61. See Lind & O'Barr, The Social Significance of Speech in the Courtroom, in LANGUAGE AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (H. Giles. & R. St.Clair eds. 1979); Conley, O'Barr & Lind, The Power of
Language:PresentationalStyle in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L. J. 1375; Erickson, Lind, Johnson &
O'Barr,Speech Style and Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of "Powerful" and
"Powerless" Speech, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 266 (1978).
62. O'Barr refers to the linguistic features that Lakoff associates with women - including
hedges, hesitation forms, polite forms, question intonation and intensifiers - as "powerless" speech
forms. See Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 61, at 1379-80.
63. O'Barr & Atkins, "Women's Language" or "Powerless Language?",in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SOCIETY, supra note 48, at 93, 102-03 ("[W]e were able to find more
women toward the high end of the continuum [measuring the frequency of Lakoff's "powerless
forms" that occurred in their speech]. Next, we noted that all the women who were aberrant ... had
something in common - an unusually high social status.... [Tlhey were typically well-educated,
professional women of middle-class background. A corresponding pattern was noted among the
aberrant men.... [Tihey tended to be men who held either subordinate, lower-status jobs or were
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data, O'Barr surmised that women-as well as minority and working
class men-tend to use "women's language" not because of any biological or cultural predisposition to speak differently, but rather because
these speakers tend to occupy "relatively powerless social positions.""
O'Barr has also examined the narrative logic of pro se litigants'
speech. 5 He has identified two typical storytelling strategies, which he
calls "relational" and "rule-oriented." 6 6 Litigants who use a relational
framework do poorly in court because the logic of their stories clashes
with the rule-breach-injury logic in which judges have learned to conceptualize legal claims. O'Barr found that socially powerless speakers, al-

ready disadvantaged by their verbal style, tend to use this relational logic
to structure their testimony. 67 Thus, on the level of story as well as sentence, powerless speakers tend to use speech strategies that increase their

disempowerment.
Another O'Barr study casts some empirical light on the feminist debate over the value of "women's language." Using simulated jury trials,
O'Barr found that jurors are likely to assess speakers who use "powerless" language as less credible, competent, intelligent, or trustworthy
than speakers who use typically "male" speech patterns.68 W. Lance
unemployed."). The data also suggested that those speakers who were more familiar with a courtroom setting were likely to use a lower proportion of powerless features.
64. Id. at 104.
65. See O'Barr & Conley, Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court
Narratives, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 661 (1985); Conley & O'Barr, Rules versus Relationshipsin Small
Claims Disputes, in CONFLICT TALK (A. Grimshaw ed. 1989)(forthcoming). Because lawyers are
rarely present in small claims proceedings to question witnesses and formal rules of evidence do not
apply, litigants in these cases are free to give extended narrative accounts with little interruption. It
was these narratives that Conley and O'Barr studied.
66. Rules versus Relationships, supra note 65, at 2-3 ("A relational account emphasizes status
and relationships, and is organized around the litigant's efforts to introduce these issues into the
trial. A rule-oriented account emphasizes rules and laws, and is tightly structured around these
issues.... Rule-oriented accounts mesh better with the logic of the law and the courts. They...
concentrate on the issues that the court is likely to deem relevant to the case. . . .By contrast,
relational accounts are filled with background details that are presumably relevant to the litigant, but
not necessarily to the court, and emphasize the complex web of relationships between the litigants
rather than legal rules or formal contracts") (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 29-30 ("[U]se of the rule-oriented approach correlates with exposure to the sources of
social power... Such exposure is in turn differentially distributed between men and women and
among the members of various classes and ethnic groups .... Indeed, the rule-oriented relational
continuum may be the discourse-level manifestation of the power-powerless stylistic continuum").
68. The study was conducted with both male and female witnesses reading prepared scripts of
"powerful" and "powerless" testimony. Among both gender groups, credibility was significantly
enhanced when "powerful" speech was used. The baseline assessment of the male witnesses, as a
group, was consistently, though only slightly, more favorable than that of the females. See O'Barr &
Atkins, supra note 63.
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Bennett and Martha Feldman have drawn similar conclusions from qualitative observations of actual trials. Their work also suggests that jurors

from dominant groups will sometimes find subordinate speakers to lack
credibility not because of the substance of their testimony, but rather because of the non-dominant linguistic and narrative conventions that they
use.

69

Neither O'Barr nor Bennett and Feldman consider whether "power-

less language" should be valued for the implicit critique that it offers of
dominant norms of speech. Nor do they ask how juries can be taught

greater tolerance for different cultural and linguistic styles, and judges
made more aware of the distortions that social inequities bring into the
fact-finding process.7" Rather, their works speak only to the question of
how the witness who wants to be taken seriously in the present-day
courtroom should learn to speak. On this narrow question, the message

of their research is clear. In today's courtrooms, language patterns that
correlate with social subordination are not "neutral." Rather, those patterns cue the listener to devalue the speech.
In reflecting on his research, O'Barr has concluded that language
practice and social power have a complex, recursive relationship. 7 1 So-

cially powerless speakers do not have the luxury of confrontation-or
even clarity-when they speak. Avoiding verbal commitment, training
one's voice to anticipate the other's pleasure-such moves can defuse the
risk of retaliation from a more powerful Other. Yet these strategies offer
protection at the cost of confessing, and compounding, the speaker's lack
of power.72
69. See W. BENNETr & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 171 (1981)("There are two ways in which systematic
biases might result from differences in storytelling practices. First, some people may lack shared
cognitive routines for presenting information in story-coded forms. The inability to produce a conventional story would leave individuals vulnerable to having truthful accounts of their actions rejected. Second, even the construction of a coherent story may not guarantee a just outcome if the
teller and the audience do not share the norms, experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw
connections among story elements. People who have different understandings about society and its
norms may disagree about the plausibility of a story.... If legal facts are reconstructed as stories
whose plausibility depends on understandings drawn from experience, then jurors who come from
different social worlds may disagree about the meaning and the plausibility of the same stories.").
70. Both researchers do address these questions peripherally, however. See infra, notes 174-75
and accompanying text.
71. O'Barr, Asking the Right QuestionsaboutLanguageand Power, in LANGUAGE AND POWER,
supra note 60, at 262, 266.
72. Robin Lakoff states the dilemma as some women might experience it:
the acquisition of this special type of speech [women's speech, or "powerless" speech]
will later be an excuse others use to keep her in a demeaning position, to refuse to take
her seriously as a human being. . . . So a girl is damned if she does, damned if she
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Sociolinguists and anthropologists have devised methods for mapping conversations across gender, class, and race gaps as complex negotiations of social power.7 3 In addition to suggesting social policies to make
the courtroom feel fairer, and less dangerous for socially subordinated
groups, such mapping exercises can help advocates respond more intelligently to the pressures that clients feel-and the rhetorical strategies that
they deploy-in encounters with their own lawyers as well as adversaries
and the courts. The second part of this essay is such an exercise.

II.

THE STORY OF MRS.

G.

With one lingering exception,7 4 our laws of evidence and procedure
doesn't. If she refuses to talk like a lady, she is ridiculed and subjected to criticism as
unfeminine; if she does learn, she is ridiculed as unable to think clearly, unable to take
part in a serious discussion: in some sense, as less than fully human. These two choices
which a woman has - to be less than a woman or less than a person - are highly
painful.
See Lakoff, supra note 49, at 5-6.
73. See, eg., Jupp, Roberts & Cook-Gumperz, Languageanddisadvantage: The hidden process,
in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 232 (J. Gumperz ed. 1982) (analyzing verbal interaction between Asian-born workers and welfare functionaries in Britain); Brown & Levinson, Social Structure, Groups and Interaction,in SOCIAL MARKERS IN SPEECH (K. Scherer & H. Giles eds. 1979). A
recent example of such work in a legal context analyzes the witnesses' testimony at the Watergate
hearings. See Molotch & Boden, Talking Social Structure:Discourse,Domination and the Watergate
Hearings,50 AM. Soc. REV. 273 (June 1985). Investigation has also extended to non-verbal communicative encounters. See, e.g., Henley & Freeman, The Sexual PoliticsofInterpersonalBehavior, in J.

Freeman,

WOMEN: A FEMINIsT PERSPECTIVE

457, 465 (forthcoming)(concluding from such studies

that "[i]n
any situation in which one group is seen as inferior to another,. . . that group will be more
submissive, more readable (non-verbally expressive), more sensitive (accurate in decoding another's
non-verbal expressions), and more accommodating (adapting to another's non-verbal behaviors)....
[Verbal characteristics of persons in inferior status positions [include] the tendencies to hesitate and
apologize, often offered as submissive gestures in the face of threats or possible threats ...
[G]estures of submission [include] falling silent (or not beginning to speak at all) when interrupted or
pointed at, and cuddling to the touch." (emphasis in original)).
74. This exception is in the area of rape law. Until feminists pressured for reform, the Model
Penal Code and the law of many states provided that a person could not be convicted of rape on the
uncorroborated testimony of the alleged rape victim, who is generally a woman. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6(5)(1980); Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365, 1366 (1972). One rationale for this corroboration requirement was the widely held belief
that rape victims are likely to lie. See. e.g., Note, CorroboratingChargesof Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
1137, 1138 (1967)("stories of rape are frequently lies or fantasies"), quoted in S. ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE 43 (1987). Although the corroboration requirement has now been eliminated in most jurisdictions, the existence of corroborating evidence is still widely used by prosecutors to determine the
disposition of rape claims. See Myers & LaFree, Sexual Assault and Its Prosecution:a Comparison
with Other Crimes, 73 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1300 (1982); Bienen, Rape III - National
Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 170 (Rutgers Univ., 1980).
A second special doctrine that courts have applied in rape cases is the cautionary instruction to
the jury. Under this rule, the court must advise jurors to evaluate the woman's testimony with
special care, "in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining
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now treat the speech of all persons according to the same formal rules,

regardless of the speaker's gender, ethnicity, or social class. Indeed, the
notion that the law should value speech according to the speaker's gender
or caste reads more like a footnote from history than a serious claim; it
lies far outside the bounds of current debate over procedural and evidentiary norms. Yet a range of evidence suggests that women and other
subordinated groups do not in fact participate in legal proceedings as

frequently or as fluently as socially dominant groups. The work of Kristin Bumiller documents how women and minorities injured by discrimination often choose to forego legal remedies, rather than risk the trauma
that they expect courtroom exposure to entail.7" A few case studies look
closely at what happens when women dare to bring gender-linked injuries into court.7 6 And a growing body of empirical work broadly surveys
the experiences of women in court-as judges, experts, attorneys, and

jurors as well as claimants and witnesses-and concludes that, in all of
these roles, many women continue to77perceive themselves to be an unwelcomed presence in the courtroom.
the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.6(5)(1980). Wigmore would have imposed a more radical means of protecting the tribunal
from the rape victim's unreliable voice: he proposed that every rape victim be examined by a qualified physician before a charge could be sent to the jury. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 737
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); Note, Rape and Women's Credibility: Problems of False Recantation and
False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen Cromwell Webb and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1987); Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific
Authority in Section 924a of the Treatiseon Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 235 (1983). It is ironic to
note that in seeking redress for sexual violence, women themselves have deployed experts in an effort
to have their own experience accepted as credible by the courts. See, e.g., Massaro, Experts,Psychology, Credibility, andRape: The Rape TraumaSyndrome Issue and its Implicationsfor Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985); Wilkes, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
the Battered Woman Syndrome in Support ofa Claim ofSelf-defense, 15 CONN. L. REV. 121 (1982).
75. See, eg., Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal
Protection, 12 SIGNS 421 (1987); K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONsTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988)(describing how victims may blame themselves for their victimization
in order to enhance their own assaulted sense of autonomy, and may avoid legal process because they
perceive it, and the confrontation with the perpetrator that it requires, as a further assault on their
security and equilibrium).
76. See, e.g., Rape and Women's Credibility supra note 74, (recounting the rape recantation of
Cathleen Crowell Webb); Bumiller, Violence and Intimacy: The Social Construction of Rape (paper
prepared for the conference on Feminism and Legal Theory: Women and Intimacy, University of
Wisconsin Law School (1987) (describing the courtroom experience of the prosecutrix in the 1984
New Bedford rape trial); Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: the Task Force Approach, 70
JUDICATURE 280 (1987); Report on the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 1 (1986-87); The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on
Women in the Courts- June 1984, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 129 (1986); Eich, Gender Bias in the
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Some women or minority speakers may not experience these feelings
at all: through social advantage and force of personality, they have
learned to speak with force and authority. As more women and minorities enter elite social positions, the ranks of such exceptional individuals
will increase. They will be more readily accepted by legal audiences as
"social males." But for many speakers who are stigmatized by gender,
race, or caste-those unwilling or unable to assume the role of a social
male-the lived experience of inequality undermines the formal guarantee of an equal opportunity to participate in the rituals of the law. Mrs.
G. is one of this majority. Through her story we can trace how the complex realities of social inequality undermine the law's formal promise of
procedural justice.
A.

The Story78

Mrs. G. is thirty-five years old, Black, and on her own. She has five
girls, ranging in age from four to fourteen. She has never told me anything
about their fathers; all I know is that she isn't getting formal child support
payments from anyone. She lives on an AFDC79 grant of just over three
hundred dollars a month and a small monthly allotment of Food Stamps.
She probably gets a little extra money from occasional jobs as a field hand
or a maid, but she doesn't share this information with me and I don't ask.
She has a very coveted unit of public housing, so she doesn't have to pay
rent. She is taking an adult basic education class at the local community
action center, which is in the same building as my own office. I often notice
her in the classroom as I pass by.
The first thing that struck me about Mrs. G., when she finally came to
my office for help one day, was the way she talked. She brought her two
Courtroom:Some Participantsare More Equal than Others, 69 JUDICATURE 339 (1986). In addition
to these studies, there is an empirical literature which examines how gender shapes the way that
male listeners respond to women speakers, both in general and in the courtroom. On the general
question, see, e.g., Rasmussen & Moely, Impression Formationasa Function ofSex Role Appropriateness of LinguisticBehavior, 14 SEX ROLES 149 (1986); D. Halpern, The Influence of Sex Role Stereotyping on Prose Recall, 12 SEx ROLES 363 (1985). On the specific context of the courtroom, see
supra text and notes 68-70. See also D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, THE ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY
17 (1977)(suggesting that jurors' presuppositions about the speaker might affect their credibility assessments). It is not merely ordinary witnesses whose credibility suffers because of audience stereotypes. Expert witnesses, female lawyers, and even female jurors are also victims of the process. See
Hodgson & Pryor, Sex Discriminationin the Courtroom:Attorney Gender and Credibility, 71 WoMEN'S LAW J. 7 (1985); Sherman, Women as Expert Witnesses: Trialand Tribulations, 19 TRIAL 46
(Aug. 1983); McHugh, Sexism Hurts Lawyer Credibility, 131 Chicago Daily L. Bulletin 1 (Dec. 6
1985); Cohen & Peterson, Bias in the Courtroom:Race and Sex Effects of Attorneys on Juror Verdicts, 9 Soc. BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 81 (1981); Weisbrod, supra note 37, at 59.
78. This story is based upon my work as a legal aid lawyer in North Carolina from 1982 to
1986. Certain details have been changed to avoid compromising client confidentiality.
79. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 615 (1982).
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oldest daughters with her. She would get very excited when she spoke,
breathing hard and waving her hands and straining, like she was searching
for the right words to say what was on her mind. Her daughters would
circle her, like two young mothers themselves, keeping the air calm as her
hands swept through it. I haven't talked with them much, but they strike
me as quite self-possessed for their years.
At the time I met Mrs. G.,I was a legal aid lawyer working in a small
community in south central North Carolina. I had grown up in the state,
but had been away for ten years, and felt like an outsider when I started
working there. I worked out of two small rooms in the back of the local
community action center. The building was run-down, but it was a store
front directly across from the Civil War Memorial on the courthouse lawn,
so it was easy for poor people to find.
There were two of us in the office, myself and a local woman who had
spent a few years in Los Angeles, working as a secretary and feeling free,
before coming back to the town to care for her aging parents. Her family
had lived in the town for generations. Not too long ago they, and most of
the other Black families I worked with, had been the property of our adversaries - the local landowners, businessmen, bureaucrats, and lawyers. Everyone seemed to have a strong sense of family, and of history, in the town.
In the late 1960s, the town had erupted into violence when a local
youth who had read some Karl Marx and Malcolm X led some five thousand people down the local highway in an effort to integrate the county
swimming pool. He had been charged with kidnapping as a result of the
incident and had fled to Cuba, China, and ultimately Detroit. My colleague
would talk to me about him in secretive tones. Her father was one of those
who sheltered him from justice on the evening of his escape. I think she
expected that one day he would come back to take up the project that was
abandoned when he fled.
Since World War II, the town had been a real backwater for Black
people. People told me that it was a place that was there to be gotten out of,
if you could figure out how. Only gradually, in the 1980s, were a few African American families moving back into the area, to take up skilled jobs in
chemicals and electronics. But the lives of most Blacks in the county in the
early 1980's could be summed up by its two claims to fame. It was the
county where the state's arch-conservative senior Senator had grown up.
Locals claimed that the Senator's father, the chief of police at one time, was
known for the boots he wore and the success he had at keeping Black people in their place. It was also the county where Steven Spielberg filmed The
Color Purple. By the time Spielberg discovered the county, the dust from
the 1960s had long since settled, and the town where I worked had the look
of a sleepy Jim Crow village that time had quite entirely passed by.
Mrs. G. and two daughters first appeared at our office one Friday
morning at about ten, without an appointment. I was booked for the whole
day; the chairs in the tiny waiting room were already filled. But I called her
in between two scheduled clients. Mrs. G. looked frightened. She showed
me a letter from the welfare office that said she had received an "overpay-
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ment" of AFDC benefits. Though she couldn't read very well, she knew
that the word "overpayment" meant fraud. Reagan's newly appointed
United States attorney, with the enthusiastic backing of Senator Jesse
Helms, had just announced plans to prosecute "welfare cheats" to the full
extent of the law. Following this lead, a grand jury had indicted several
local women on federal charges of welfare fraud. Therefore, Mrs. G. had
some reason to believe that "fraud" carried the threat of jail.
The "letter" was actually a standardized notice that I had seen many
times before. Whenever the welfare department's computer showed that a
client had received an overpayment, it would kick out this form, which
stated the amount at issue and advised the client to pay it back. The notice
did not say why the agency had concluded that a payment error had been
made. Nor did it inform the client that she might contest the county's determination. Rather, the notice assigned the client a time to meet with the
county's fraud investigator to sign a repayment contract and warned that if
the client chose not to show up at this meeting further action would be
taken. Mrs. G.'s meeting with the fraud investigator was set for the following Monday.
At the time, I was negotiating with the county over the routine at these
meetings and the wording on the overpayment form. Therefore, I knew
what Mrs. G. could expect at the meeting. The fraud worker would scold
her and then ask her to sign a statement conceding the overpayment, consenting to a 10 percent reduction of her AFDC benefits until the full
amount was paid back, and advising that the government could still press
criminal charges against her.
I explained to Mrs. G. that she did not have to go to the meeting on
Monday, or to sign any forms. She seemed relieved and asked if I could
help her get the overpayment straightened out. I signed her on as a client
and, aware of the other people waiting to see me, sped through my canned
explanation of how I could help her. Then I called the fraud investigator,
canceled Monday's meeting, and told him I was representing her. Thinking
that the emergency had been dealt with, I scheduled an appointment for
Mrs. G.for the following Tuesday and told her not to sign anything or talk
to anyone at the welfare office until I saw her again.
The following Tuesday Mrs. G.arrived at my office looking upset. She
said she had gone to her fraud appointment because she had been "afraid
not to." She had signed a paper admitting she owed the county about six
hundred dollars, and agreeing to have her benefits reduced by thirty dollars
a month for the year and a half it would take to repay the amount. She
remembered I had told her not to sign anything; she looked like she was
waiting for me to yell at her or tell her to leave. I suddenly saw a woman
caught between two bullies, both of us ordering her what to do.
I hadn't spent enough time with Mrs. G. the previous Friday. For me,
it had been one more emergency-a quick fix, an appointment, out the
door. It suddenly seemed pointless to process so many clients, in such haste,
without any time to listen, to challenge, to think together. But what to do,
with so many people waiting at the door? I mused on these thoughts for a
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moment, but what I finally said was simpler. I was furious. Why had she
gone to the fraud appointment and signed the repayment contract? Why
hadn't she done as we had agreed? Now it would be so much harder to
contest the county's claim: we would have to attack both the repayment
contract and the underlying overpayment claim. Why hadn't she listened to
me?
Mrs. G.just looked at me in silence. She finally stammered that she
knew she had been "wrong" to go to the meeting when I had told her not to
and she was "sorry."
After we both calmed down I mumbled my own apology and turned to
the business at hand. She told me that a few months before she had received
a cash settlement for injuries she and her oldest daughter had suffered in a
minor car accident. After medical bills had been paid and her lawyer had
taken his fees, her award came to $592. Before Mrs. G. cashed the insurance check, she took it to her AFDC worker to report it and ask if it was all
right for her to spend it. The system had trained her to tell her worker
about every change in her life. With a few exceptions, any "income" she
reported would be subtracted, dollar for dollar, from her AFDC stipend.
The worker was not sure how to classify the insurance award. After
talking to a supervisor, however, she told Mrs. G. that the check would not
affect her AFDC budget and she could spend it however she wanted.
Mrs. G. cashed her check that same afternoon and took her five girls
on what she described to me as a "shopping trip." They bought Kotex,
which they were always running short on at the end of the month. They
also bought shoes, dresses for school, and some frozen food. Then she made
two payments on her furniture bill. After a couple of wonderful days, the
money was gone.
Two months passed. Mrs. G. received and spent two AFDC checks.
Then she got the overpayment notice, asking her to repay to the county an
amount equal to her insurance award.
When she got to this point, I could see Mrs. G. getting upset again. She
had told her worker everything, but nobody had explained to her what she
was supposed to do. She hadn't meant to do anything wrong. I said I
thought the welfare office had done something wrong in this case, not Mrs.
G. I thought we could get the mess straightened out, but we'd need more
information. I asked if she could put together a list of all the things she had
bought with the insurance money. If she still had any of the receipts, she
should bring them to me. I would look at her case file at the welfare office
and see her again in a couple of days.
The file had a note from the caseworker confirming that Mrs. G. had
reported the insurance payment when she received it. The note also showed
that the worker did not include the amount in calculating her stipend. The
"overpayment" got flagged two months later when a supervisor, doing a
random "quality control" check on her file, discovered the worker's note.
Under AFDC law, the insurance award was considered a "lump sum pay-
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ment.",80 Aware that the law regarding such payments had recently
changed, the supervisor decided to check out the case with the state quality
control office.
He learned that the insurance award did count as income for AFDC
purposes under the state's regulations; 8 1 indeed, the county should have cut
Mrs. G. off of welfare entirely for almost two months on the theory that her
family could live for that time off of the insurance award. The lump sum
rule was a Reagan Administration innovation designed to teach poor people
the virtues of saving money and planning for the future.8 2 Nothing in the
new provision required that clients be warned in advance about the rule
change, however.8 3 Only in limited circumstances was a state free to waive

the rule.8 4 Without a waiver, Mrs. G. would have to pay back $592 to the
welfare office. If the county didn't try to collect 85
the sum from Mrs. G., it
would be sanctioned for an administrative error.

80. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(Supp. III 1982 ed.) and 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F)(1988). The
implementing regulation states that "[w]hen the AFDC assistance unit's income ... exceeds the
State need standard for the family because of receipt of nonrecurring earned or unearned lump sum
income (including ... personal injury... awards, to the extent it is not earmarked and used for the
purpose for which it is paid, i.e., monies for back medical bills resulting from accidents or injury
... ), the family will be ineligible for aid for the full number of months derived by dividing the sum of
the lump sum income and other income by the monthly need standard for a family of that size."
81. In contrast to other federal statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code, which exclude
insurance settlements for personal injury from income, see, eg., I.R.C. § 104 (1982), the AFDC
statute has been interpreted to authorize states to include personal injury awards in the income
definition to which the lump sum rule applies. The federal regulations implementing the lump sum
rule went farther than the statutory authorization, by affirmatively requiringthe states to classify all
non-recurring lump sum payments, including insurance awards, as income. See supra note 80. The
statute's inclusion of personal injury awards in its definition of "income" was unsuccessfully challenged by poverty advocates in Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987)(AFDC statute permits states
to define personal injury awards as "income" for AFDC purposes, even though common usage and
other federal statutory schemes do not do so).
82. The provision was added to the AFDC statute by § 2304 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), 95 STAT. 845, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(Supp. III 1982). See S.
REP. No. 35, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 436, reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 396,
702; Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983).
83. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988)(Federal AFDC regulations do not require
that each recipient be given advance notification of the lump sum provision before the provision can
be enforced).
84. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F)("A State may shorten the period of ineligibility when:
... the lump sum income or a portion thereof becomes unavailable to the family for a reason beyond
the control of the family.. ."). In its explanation of this regulation, the Department of Health and
Human Services stated that "a State may shorten the period of ineligibility where it finds a lifethreatening circumstance exists, and the non-recurring income causing the period of ineligibility has
been or will be expended in connection with the life-threatening circumstance." See 47 Fed. Reg.
5654 (Feb. 5, 1982).
85. The federal government monitors the state welfare agencies which administer the AFDC
program for erroneous overpayments, but not erroneous underpayments. If a state's "error rate" is
deemed too great, the federal government sanctions the state by reducing its AFDC funding. See
Casey & Mannix, Quality Control in PublicAssistance: Victimizing the Poor through One-sided Accountability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381 (1989). This policy was reviewed and critiqued in a
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I met again with Mrs. G. the following Friday. When I told her what I
had pieced together from her file, she insisted that she had asked her
worker's permission before spending the insurance money. Then she
seemed to get flustered and repeated what had become a familiar refrain.
She didn't want to make any trouble. She hadn't meant to do anything
wrong. I told her that it looked to me like it was the welfare office-and not
her-who had done something wrong. I said I would try to get the county
to drop the matter, but I thought we might have to go to a hearing, finally,
to win.
Mrs. G. had been in court a few times to get child support and to
defend against evictions, but she had never been to a welfare hearing. She
knew that it was not a good idea to get involved in hearings, however, and
she understood why. Fair hearings were a hassle and an embarrassment to
the county. A hearing meant pulling an eligibility worker and several managers out of work for a few hours, which-given the chronic under-staffing
of the welfare office-was more than a minor inconvenience. It also meant
exposing the county's administrative problems to state-level scrutiny.
Front-line eligibility workers were especially averse to hearings because the county's easiest way to defend against its own blunders was to
point to the worker as the source of the problem. As a result, the workers
did all they could to persuade clients that they would lose, in the end, if
they insisted on hearings. The prophesy was self-fulfilling, given the subtle
and diffuse retaliation that would often follow for the occasional client who
disregarded this advice.
I could tell that Mrs. G. felt pressure from me to ask for a hearing, but
she also seemed angry at the welfare office for asking her to pay for their
mistake. I said that it was her decision, and not mine, whether to ask for the
hearing, and reassured her that I would do my best to settle the matter, no
matter what she decided. I also told her she could drop the hearing request
at any time, for any reason, before or even after the event. When she nervously agreed to file the hearing request, I didn't second-guess her decision.
My negotiations failed. The county took the position that the worker
should have suspended Mrs. G's AFDC as soon as the client had reported
the insurance payment. This mistake was "regrettable," but it didn't shift
the blame for the overpayment. Mrs. G.-and not the county-had received more welfare money than she was entitled to. End of discussion. I
then appealed to state officials. They asked if the county would concede that
the worker told Mrs. G. she was free to spend her insurance award as she
pleased. When county officials refused, and the details of this conversation
did not show up in the client's case file, the state declined to intervene. Mrs.
G. then had to drop the matter or gear up for a hearing. After a lot of
hesitation, she decided to go forward.
study commissioned by Congress and performed by the National Academy of Sciences in 1988. See
Panel on Quality Control of Family Assistance Programs, Committee on National Statistics, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, FROM QUALITY CONTROL TO QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT IN AFDC AND MEDICAID (F. Kramer ed. 1988).
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Mrs. G. brought all five of her girls to my office to prepare for the
hearing. Our first task was to decide on a strategy for the argument. I told
her that I saw two stories we could tell. The first was the story she had told
me. It was the "estoppel ' 8 6 story, the story of the wrong advice she got
from her worker about spending the insurance check. The second story was
one that I had come up with from reading the law. The state had laid the
groundwork for this story when it opted for the "life necessities" waiver
permitted by federal regulations.8 7 If a client could show that she8 8 had
spent the sum to avert a crisis situation, then it would be considered "unavailable" as income, and her AFDC benefits would not be suspended. I
didn't like this second story very much, and I wasn't sure that Mrs. G.
would want to go along with it. How could I ask her to distinguish "life
necessities" from mere luxuries, when she was keeping five children alive on
three hundred dollars a month, and when she had been given no voice in
the calculus that had determined her "needs."
Yet I felt that the necessities story might work at the hearing, while
"estoppel" would unite the county and state against us. According to legal
aid's welfare specialist in the state capital, state officials didn't like the lump
sum rule. It made more paper work for the counties. And, by knocking
families off the federally financed AFDC program, the rule increased the
pressure on state and county-funded relief programs. But the only way the
state could get around the rule without being subject to federal sanctions
was through the necessities exception. Behind the scenes, state officials were
saying to our welfare specialist that they intended to interpret the exception
broadly. In addition to this inside information that state officials would prefer the necessities tale, I knew from experience that they would feel comfortable with the role that story gave to Mrs. G. It would place her on her
knees, asking for pity as she described how hard she was struggling to make
86. In public benefit cases, the courts have generally held that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
used against the government when a government agent's misinformation results in a claimant's loss
of benefits. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785 (1981). The Hansen opinion states in dicta that
estoppel may be justified in some circumstances, but the court did not specify what those circumstances might be. Id. at 788. Lower court cases have allowed estoppel against the government when
an official gives a claimant erroneous factual information which the claimant was not in a position to
identify and avoid, and when compensating the claimant will neither undermine important federal
interests or deplete the public fisc. See, eg., Scime v. Secretary of H.H.S., 647 F. Supp. 89, 93
(W.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 822 F.2d 7; McDonald v. Schweiker, 537 F. Supp. 47, 50 (N.D.Ind. 1981).
87. See supra note 84. The state implemented the exception for "life threatening circumstances"
through D.S.S. Administrative Letter No. IPA-8-84 (DSS-3430)("Lump Sum Payments")(March,
82). The regulation illustrates "Life-threatening situations" by a list of six specific events, such as
"serious health hazard to a member of the assistance unit, such as but not limited to a situation
where the recipient's house is uninhabitable and the recipient must use the lump sum for essential
repairs or necessary utilities." The seventh item on the list authorizes the "county director or his
designee" to determine other life-threatening situations on a case by case basis. See id. § C-l-g.
88. I use "she" because virtually all of my clients who received AFDC benefits were single
mothers. Although single fathers with custody of their children are technically eligible to receive
AFDC, they account for an insubstantial percentage of the recipient pool: in my four years of welfare advocacy, I did not encounter any single fathers on AFDC.
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ends meet.89
The estoppel story would be entirely different. In it, Mrs. G. would be
pointing a finger, turning the county itself into the object of scrutiny. She
would accuse welfare officials of wrong, and claim that they had caused her
injury. She would demand that the county bend its own rules, absorb the
overpayment out of its own funds, and run the risk of sanction from the
state for its error.
As I thought about the choices, I felt myself in a bind. The estoppel
story would feel good in the telling, but at the likely cost of losing the hearing, and provoking the county's ire. The hearing officer-though charged to
be neutral-would surely identify with the county in this challenge to the
government's power to evade the costs of its own mistakes. The necessities
story would force Mrs. G. to grovel, but it would give both county and state
what they wanted to hear-another "yes sir" welfare recipient.
This bind was familiar to me as a poverty lawyer. I felt it most strongly
in disability hearings, when I would counsel clients to describe themselves
as totally helpless in order to convince the court that they met the statutory
definition of disability.90 But I had faced it in AFDC work as well, when I
taught women to present themselves as abandoned, depleted of resources,
and encumbered by children to qualify for relief. 9 1 I taught them to say
yes to the degrading terms of "income security," as it was called - invasions of sexual privacy, disruptions of kin-ties, the forced choice of one sibling's welfare over another's. 92 Lawyers had tried to challenge these
89. The costs of this posture have been eloquently described by Patricia Williams in Alchemical
Notes, supra note 24, at 419-20 (1987):
I got through law school, quietly driven by the false idol of the white-man-within-me,
and I absorbed a whole lot of the knowledge and the values which had enslaved me and
my foremothers.... I learned to undo images of power with images of powerlessness; to
clothe the victims of excessive power in utter, bereft naivete; to cast them as defenseless
supplicants raising - pleading- defenses of duress, undue influence and fraud. I
learned that the best way to give voice to those whose voice had been suppressed was to
argue that they had no voice.
90. To be eligible for disability payments under the Social Security Act, one must be unable to
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impariment that is expected to result in death or to continue for at least 12 months. See 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(1982).
91. Under current law, in order to receive AFDC benefits, a family must meet the categorical
requirement of "deprivation" - the absence of two able-bodied parents in the home - as well as a
means test. See 42 U.S.C. 606(a)(1982). This requirement has been widely criticized for its exclusion
of two-earner families living in poverty, and for the consequent pressure it places upon poor couples
to live apart in order to receive benefits. See, e.g., R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE
PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986); Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the
Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV.1431 (1988).
92. To receive AFDC, women - with narrowly drawn exemptions for cause - must cooperate
with the state in prosecuting paternity and child support actions, and in assigning child support
payments to the state to repay AFDC benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(26)(B)(1982). In Roe v. Norton,
422 U.S. 391 (1975), the Supreme Court found these conditions to be constitutional. See Sugarman,
Roe v. Norton: Coerced Maternal Cooperation, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY,
LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 365 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985). In addition, a mother must apply
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conditions, but for the most part the courts had confirmed that the system
could take such license with its women. After all, poor women were free to
say no to welfare if they weren't pleased with its terms.93
As I contemplated my role as an advocate, I felt again the familiar
sense that I had been taken. Here I was, asking Mrs. G. to trust me, talking
with her about our conspiring together to beat the system and strategizing
together to change it. Here I was, thinking that what I was doing was educative and empowering or at least supportive of those agendas, when all my
efforts worked, in the end, only to teach her to submit to the system in all of
the complex ways that it demanded.
In the moment it took for these old thoughts to flit through my mind,
Mrs. G. and her children sat patiently in front of me, fidgeting, waiting for
me to speak. My focus returned to them and the immediate crisis they faced
if their AFDC benefits were cut. What story should we tell at the hearing, I
wondered out loud. How should we decide? Mechanically at first, I began
to describe to her our "options."
When I explained the necessities story, Mrs. G. said she might get confused trying to remember what all she had bought with the money. Why did
they need to know those things anyway? I could tell she was getting angry.
I wondered if two months of benefits-six hundred dollars-was worth it.
Maybe paying it back made more sense. I reminded her that we didn't have
to tell this story at the hearing, and in fact, we didn't have to go to the
hearing at all. Although I was trying to choose my words carefully, I felt
myself saying too much. Why had I even raised the question of which story
to tell? It was a tactical decision-not the kind of issue that clients were
supposed to decide. 94 Why hadn't I just told her to answer the questions
that I chose to ask?
Mrs. G. asked me what to do. I said I wanted to see the welfare office
admit their mistake, but I was concerned that if we tried to make them, we
would lose. Mrs. G. said she still felt like she'd been treated unfairly butin the next breath-"I didn't mean to do anything wrong." Why couldn't
for AFDC benefits for all of her children living in the household, even those who have an independent source of income such as child support or Social Security benefits. That income is then deemed
available to the other children, and justifies a cut in the family's AFDC grant. See 42 U.S.C.
602(a)(38)(Supp. III 1982). This provision was found constitutional in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587 (1987). See Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to
Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713 (1987-88). For a history of
oppressive conditions of AFDC participation on the state level, see W. Bell, AID TO DEPENDENT
CHILDREN (1965).
93. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 608. The majority responded to the record of harms
caused by the sibling-deeming requirement by stating that "[tihe law does not require any custodial
parent to apply for AFDC benefits." The dissent responded that "[t]he court has thus assumed that
participation in a benefit program reflects a decision by the recipient that he or she is better off by
meeting whatever conditions are attached to participation than not receiving benefits." Id.
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2 Comment (1983)("In questions
of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues ....").
Whether this provision intends for lawyers unilaterally to select the basic legal theories they will
advance in a case is, however, a subject of debate.
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we tell both stories? With this simple question, I lost all pretense of strategic subtlety or control. I said sure.
I asked for the list she had promised to make of all the things she
bought with the insurance money. Kotex, I thought, would speak for itself,
but why, I asked, had she needed to get the girls new shoes? She explained
that the girls' old shoes were pretty much torn up, so bad that the other
kids would make fun of them at school. Could she bring in the old shoes?
She said she could.
We rehearsed her testimony, first about her conversation with her
worker regarding the insurance award and then about the Kotex and the
shoes. Maybe the hearing wouldn't be too bad for Mrs. G., especially if I
could help her see it all as strategy, rather than the kind of talking she could
do with people she could trust. She had to distance herself at the hearing.
She shouldn't expect them to go away from it understanding why she was
angry, or what she needed, or what her life was like. The hearing was their
territory. The most she could hope for was to take it over for a moment,
leading them to act out her agenda. Conspiracy was the theme she must
keep repeating as she dutifully played her role.
We spent the next half hour rehearsing the hearing. By the end, she
seemed reasonably comfortable with her part. Then we practiced the crossexamination, the ugly questions that-even though everyone conceded to
be irrelevant-still always seemed to get asked . . . questions about her
children, their fathers, how long she had been on welfare, why she wasn't
working instead. This was the part of these sessions that I disliked the most.
We practiced me objecting and her staying quiet and trying to stay composed. By the end of our meeting, the whole thing was holding together,
more or less.
The hearing itself was in a small conference room at the welfare office.
Mrs. G. arrived with her two oldest daughters and five boxes of shoes.
When we got there the state hearing officer and the county AFDC director
were already seated at the hearing table in lively conversation. The AFDC
director was a youngish man with sandy hair and a beard. He didn't seem
like a bureaucrat until he started talking. I knew most of the hearing officers
who came to the county, but this one, a pale, greying man who slouched in
his chair, was new to me. I started feeling uneasy as I rehearsed how I
would plead this troubling case to a stranger.
We took our seats across the table from the AFDC director. The hearing officer set up a portable tape recorder and got out his bible. Mrs. G.'s
AFDC worker, an African American woman about her age, entered
through a side door and took a seat next to her boss. The hearing officer
turned on the recorder, read his obligatory opening remarks, and asked all
the witnesses to rise and repeat before god that they intended to tell the
truth. Mrs. G. and her worker complied.
The officer then turned the matter over to me. I gave a brief account of
the background events and then began to question Mrs. G. First I asked her
about the insurance proceeds. She explained how she had received an insurance check of about six hundred dollars following a car accident in which
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she and her oldest daughter had been slightly injured. She said that the
insurance company had already paid the medical bills and the lawyer; the
last six hundred dollars was for her and her daughter to spend however
they wanted. I asked her if she had shown the check to her AFDC worker
before she cashed it. She stammered. I repeated the question. She said she
may have taken the check to the welfare office before she cashed it, but she
couldn't remember for sure. She didn't know if she had gotten a chance to
talk to anyone about it. Her worker was always real busy.
Armed with the worker's own sketchy notation of the conversation in
the case file, I began to cross-examine my client, coaxing her memory about
the event we had discussed so many times before. I asked if she remembered
her worker telling her anything about how she could spend the money.
Mrs. G. seemed to be getting more uncomfortable. It was quite a predicament for her, after all. If she "remembered" what her worker had told her,
would her story expose mismanagement in the welfare office, or merely
scapegoat another Black woman, who was not too much better off than
herself?
When she repeated that she couldn't remember, I decided to leave the
estoppel story for the moment. Maybe I could think of a way to return to it
later. I moved on to the life necessitates issue. I asked Mrs. G. to recount,
as best she could, exactly how she had spent the insurance money. She
showed me the receipts she had kept for the furniture payments and I put
them into evidence. She explained that she was buying a couple of big mattresses for the kids and a new kitchen table. She said she had also bought
some food-some frozen meat and several boxes of Kotex for all the girls.
The others in the room shifted uneasily in their chairs. Then she said she
had also bought her daughters some clothes and some shoes. She had the
cash register receipt for the purchase.
Choosing my words carefully, I asked why she had needed to buy the
new shoes. She looked at me for a moment with an expression that I
couldn't read. Then she stated, quite emphatically, that they were Sunday
shoes that she had bought with the money. The girls already had everyday
shoes to wear to school, but she had wanted them to have nice shoes for
church too. She said no more than two or three sentences, but her voice
sounded different-stronger, more composed-than I had known from her
before. When she finished speaking the room was silent, except for the incessant hum of the tape machine on the table and the fluorescent lights
overhead. In that moment, I felt the boundaries of our "conspiracy" shift.
Suddenly I was on the outside, with the folks on the other side of the table,
the welfare director and the hearing officer. The only person I could not
locate in this new alignment was Mrs. G.'s welfare worker.
I didn't ask Mrs. G. to pull out the children's old shoes, as we'd rehearsed. Nor did I make my "life necessities" argument. My lawyer's language couldn't add anything to what she had said. They would have to
figure out for themselves why buying Sunday shoes for her children-and
saying it-was indeed a "life necessity" for this woman. After the hearing,
Mrs. G. seemed elated. She asked me how she had done at the hearing and I
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told her that I thought she was great. I warned her, though, that we could
never be sure, in this game, who was winning, or even what side anyone was
on.

We lost the hearing and immediately petitioned for review by the chief
hearing officer. I wasn't sure of the theory we'd argue, but I wanted to keep
the case open until I figured out what we could do.
Three days after the appeal was filed, the county welfare director
called me unexpectedly, to tell me that the county had decided to withdraw
its overpayment claim against Mrs. G. He explained that on a careful review of its own records, the county had decided that it wouldn't be "fair" to
make Mrs. G. pay the money back. I said I was relieved to hear that they
had decided, finally, to come to a sensible result in the case. I was sorry
they hadn't done so earlier. I then said something about how confusing the
lump sum rule was and how Mrs. G.'s worker had checked with her supervisor before telling Mrs. G. it was all right to spend the insurance money. I
said I was sure that the screw up was not anyone's fault. He mumbled a
bureaucratic pleasantry and we hung up.
When I told Mrs. G. that she had won, she said she had just wanted to
"do the right thing," and that she hoped they understood that she'd never
meant to do anything wrong. I repeated that they were the ones who had
made the mistake. Though I wasn't sure exactly what was going on inside
the welfare office, at least this crisis was over.
B.

The Terrain

Mrs. G. had a hearing in which all of the rituals of due process were
scrupulously observed. Yet she did not find her voice welcomed at that
hearing. A complex pattern of social, economic, and cultural forces underwrote the procedural formalities, repressing and devaluing her voice.
Out of that web of forces, I will identify three dominant themes, all of
them linked, sometimes subtly, to Mrs. G.'s social identity as poor,
Black, and female. The first theme is intimidation. Mrs. G. did not feel
that she could risk speaking her mind freely to welfare officials. She lived
in a community in which the social hierarchy had a caste-like rigidity. As
a poor Black woman, her position at the bottom accorded her virtually
no social or political power. She depended on welfare to survive and did
not expect this situation to change in the future. She was simply not situated to take action that might displease her superiors. The second theme
is humiliation. Even if Mrs. G. could find the courage to speak out at the
hearing, her words were not likely to be heard as legitimate, because of
the language she had learned to speak as a poor woman of color, and
because of the kind of person that racist and gendered imagery portrayed
her to be. The final theme is objectification. Because Mrs. G. had little
voice in the political process that set the substantive terms of her welfare

1990]

THE HEARING OF MRS. G.

eligibility, 95 the issues that she was constrained to talk about at the hearing bore little relation to her own feelings about the meaning and fairness
of the state's action. I will explore each of these forces by positioning
myself with Mrs. G., and imagining how each might have affected her.96
1. Intimidation:The Violence of Caste. Perhaps Mrs. G.'s strongest feelings, as she approached the hearing, were fear and intimidation.
The people she had to face at the hearing were the same ones who would
decide if she would get welfare and Food Stamps in the future. From her
standpoint, they were also the ones who could take her children away, if
they wanted to,9 7 or make it hard for her to stay in her apartment or find
the occasional jobs she needed to make ends meet.
95. See, eg., M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(1963)("Welfare recipients do not by and large belong to unions, fraternal organizations, political
parties. They are without lobbies of their own; they put forward no legislative program. As a group,
they are atomized. They have no face; they have no voice."). Though welfare recipients did obtain
some political leverage in the late 1960s and 1970s, Harrington's description could characterize the
early to mid-1980s. The exclusion of people of color from the political process has been demonstrated in voting rights cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1965). For instance, in the case of Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986), a class action by Black voters in North Carolina, the court affirmed
the District Court's findings that "the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education,
housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted ... to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black
voters to participate equally in the political process..."
96. Although I base this section on two years of intensive work with women in the social location of Mrs. G., this section should properly be a conversation with her, rather than an imaginative
projection based on my own experience with her. Such a project, however, is beyond the scope of the
Article, as it is beyond the bounds of much feminist scholarship. This limitation in my method
deserves close attention, because it raises the broad question of how feminist scholars might write
about subordination - about gender -without making other women into objects of study, and
keeping for themselves the power to name problems and imagine solutions. In this essay, I mark this
question by rejecting the universalizing rhetoric of "normal" scholarship and writing stories instead.
But my story - about Mrs. G.'s claim to name her own needs - does not attend to her as a subject
any more than the grandiose prescriptions of the policy engineers. My storytelling still guards the
power to interpret firmly in my own hands.
A feminist alternative to this monologic approach to scholarship would entail conversation and
translation, rather than observation and pronouncement. It would entail dialogue with the other
subject and then the mutual creation of forms for expanding that discussion to a wider audience. The
participants would themselves devise the appropriate method for that communication in each situation. In some cases, it might be a quantitative study, using mainstream social science methodology,
or an essay in the discourse of academic philosophy. In other cases, however, the communication
might take a quite different form. For two accounts in which groups, working with outsiders, chose
drama as their "method" for communicating their analysis of their own political situation, see
White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1989 Wisc. L. REV.
699 and White, Mobilizing on the Margins ofLitigation, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535
(1987-88).
97. Though child protection and social services were administratively separated from income
maintenance by federal law in the 1970's, in Mrs. G.'s experience the social workers who control the
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The ground of her fear was very deep. It reflected the long history of
violence toward her people in that county and the daily reminders that

the history was not over.98 But her fear also responded to her present-day
relationship to the welfare office. First of all, a convergence of factors-a

lack of child care, vocational training, and, most importantly safe, stable,
decent-paying jobs-made her dependent on the county, the welfare office, and the housing authority, to survive.9 9 And she knew that the rules
of welfare would give the county plenty of ways to make her life hard if
she became known as a troublemaker.
Thus, her fear reflected the racial caste system that still structured
social relations in the community, and the more particular welfare doctrines that gave the dominant caste, the white power structure-she
called it simply "the Man"-a potent modem-day weapon for keeping

her quiet. The caste system in the post-Bellum American South has been
treated at length in historical and anthropological literature." Mrs.
G.'s story suggests that, in spite of the sweeping changes that the Civil

Rights era brought in social norms and legal structures, this system has
not changed much for people like her in the half-century between the
1930s and the 1980s.
Her fear also reflected her sense that her welfare "entitlements" of-

fered her no real security. The function of welfare to control the poor has
abuse and neglect process are closely linked to the eligibility workers who control the AFDC
program.
98. In addition to the macroeconomic conditions - the poverty, unemployment, housing and
job segregation - that were a direct legacy of slavery in that community, there were also small
incidents to remind her of that history and her people's place - Klan marches, a local protest when
the Department of the Interior insisted on renaming on official U.S. Government maps a local
landmark called "Nigger-Head Creek" that celebrated a lynching.
99. There is a literature exploring the impact of "continuing relationships" on contract disputes.
See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 32-33 (1980); Handler, Continuing Relationshipsand the Administrative Process: Social Welfare, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 687; Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: a PreliminaryStudy,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 483; MacNeil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REv. 340
(1983); Yngvesson, Re-examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV 623. This
literature can inform our understanding of constraints felt by welfare-dependent claimants like Mrs.
G. in disputes with welfare agencies.
100. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, B. GARDNER & M. GARDNER, DEEP SOUTH: A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF CASTE AND CLASS (1941); J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN
TOWN 245 (1937) (explaining how the sanctions of lynching and starvation were systematically used
to control Blacks, and to punish them for transgression). For insight into the logic and social psychology of caste, see, ag., F. FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (C. Markmann trans. 1967); A.
MEMMI, supra note 8; A. MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1965). In spite of the
violence and repression of the caste system in the south, African Americans developed a thriving
culture of resistance and survival. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, supra note 24.

1990]

THE HEARING OF MRS. G.

been well studied.10 1 Recent changes in the structure of welfare law,
changes made in the 1970s and 1980s have made it a stronger weapon of
social control.102 These changes have made welfare eligibility more
bureaucratized, more rule-bound than it had previously been.l°3 Initially,
welfare advocates supported the formalization of eligibility rules as a way
to extend benefits to Blacks and other groups who were excluded in the
earlier regime of unfettered local discretion." ° But by the early 1980s,
the formalization of eligibility rules was serving a very different political
agenda. In the 1980s legalistic eligibility requirements were imposed to
reduce welfare expenditures. In addition to providing new reasons for
denying welfare to otherwise eligible clients, new procedural requirements made welfare programs too complex and burdensome for many
poor people to negotiate.'0 5

In Mrs. G.'s experience, these highly formalized rules have a more
important function than the wholesale exclusion of people from the rolls.
They also keep people in fear. First of all, "churning," the occasional,
arbitrary termination of large numbers of people for technical reasons,
has the effect of keeping all recipients uncertain about whether their next
check will come.10 6 And the technical rules, although they appear very
rigid, actually conceal countless enclaves of discretion, hidden places for
07
harassing clients who get out of line, and obscuring the human agency1
101. See, e.g., the classic work by F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1971).
See also W. Bell, supra note 92; M. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
102. F. BLOCK, R. CLOWARD, B. EHRENREICH, & F. PIVEN, THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE (1987); J. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 457 (1987-88); R. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON
THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1985).
103. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198
(1983); Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
104. See W. BELL, supra note 92.
105. See Lipsky, BureaucraticDisentitlementin Social Welfare Programs,58 SOC. POL'Y REV. 3
(1984). See also City of Los Angeles vs. County of Los Angeles, No. C-655274 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
Oct. 19, 1987)(alleging that bureaucratic requirements, unrelated to substantive eligibility, are used
by welfare officials in the County of Los Angeles to deprive eligible people of benefits and thereby
reduce general relief expenditures).
106. See Dehavenon, Administrative Closingsof PublicAssistance Cases: The Rise ofHunger and
Homelessness in New York City, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 741 (1987-88).
107. There is a literature on the function of bureaucratic structures to obscure human agency.
See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); K.
FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY (1984); N. FRASER, Social Movements

vs. DisciplinaryBureaucracies:The Discourses of Social Needs (University of Minnesota Center for
Humanistic Studies Occasional Papers, No. 8, 1987); Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial
Practices,22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 771 (1988).
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behind that harassment.' 8 Mrs. G. believed that "going to legal aid" or
"asking for a hearing" were the best ways to make sure that this discretion would be used against her.109

Thus, Mrs. G.'s fear of confronting the welfare office was engendered by concrete legal and social arrangements. These structures subverted the formal protections of the hearing process and posed a barrier

to her speech. Had Mrs. G. not found her way to a lawyer, that barrier
might have excluded her from the hearing process altogether: it would
certainly have been safer for her simply to stay away." 0 But even with a
lawyer to protect her, Mrs. G.'s deep fear of retaliation was not com-

pletely put to rest. She did not need to be a legal scholar to understand
that the law was largely impotent-or indifferent-to the subtle texture

of retaliation in the welfare office. Her only real protection lay in the selfnegating verbal strategies that she had learned so well-speaking female,
crafting her words like a mirror' 1 ' to reflect what she sensed that the
108. For instance, under the "new formalism", workers still have the discretion to decide how
many pieces of paper they shall require a client to submit to verify her financial circumstances, or
how often the client must come to the office to have her eligibility recertified. Furthermore, workers
have the discretion to "misplace" documentation that the client has submitted, or to fail to notify her
of a required appointment. These latter acts, admittedly not authorized by the letter of the rules, are
nonetheless very hard for the client to challenge, even if she has legal assistance to do so. This shift in
the function of formalism, from expanding to constricting welfare entitlement, shows that it cannot
be evaluated in the abstract, apart from the concrete power relations of the setting. See Abel, In.
formalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375 (1985). Furthermore, as
current circumstances indicate, no system can be characterized as formal or discretionary in the
abstract. Rather, the judgment must be made in reference to the politics that motivate the actors
within it. For further analysis of the conditions under which discretion can be benign, or might
operate in the client's favor, see J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY & BUREAUCRACY (1986); Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern!
Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999 (1988); Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy,and Class, supra note 6.
109. Examples of workers warning clients to stay away from legal aid or advising them not to
ask for hearings are extremely common in my experience as an advocate. In a field course I taught in
the spring semester of 1988 in Los Angeles, the students, who were placed as advocates in welfare
offices, were shocked by how universal this phenomenon was, and rightly insisted that "the First
Amendment" should bar such behavior. The problem lies in proving the retaliatory motive behind
subtle, discretionary acts, in proving the systematic nature of the behavior, and in designing an
enforceable class-wide remedy. It is surely a problem that should be taken on.
110. In John Gwaltney's ethnographic study of working class Blacks, DRYLONOSO: A PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA, Ms. Ruth Shays gives expression to this choice, familiar to all
subordinated peoples. After stating that things have not changed much since slavery, Ms. Shays
explains that "our foreparents had sense enough not to spill their in-guts to whitefolkes .... They
just kept everything to themselves." J. GWALTNEY, DRYLONGSO: A PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA

31 (1981).
11I. See WOOLF, supranote 22. A Black working class man states the same theme to anthropologist John Gwaltney when he explains that "[w]hite people want black people to do whatever white
people want them to do at that time. They just don't want black people to have a mind of their own,
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-

"the Man" -

wanted her to say.

2. Humiliation: The Stigma of Welfare Fraud. A second local
force, the imagery of welfare fraud, posed a further barrier to Mrs. G.'s
speaking frankly and with dignity at the hearing. While her social and
economic marginality made her reluctant to speak at all, the mythology
of welfare fraud worked to undermine her confidence and credibility
when she did speak. This imagery predisposed the hearing officer to distrust Mrs. G. and led her to second-guess the integrity of her own actions. Furthermore, overbroad measures to control fraud deterred her
from voicing any challenge to welfare officials.
"Welfare fraud" has long been one of the dominant themes expressing the ambivalence, indeed aversion, within modem political culture, to
welfare.1 12 "Fraud" connotes an idea-a negative image of the "typical
welfare recipient." '13 At the same time, it justifies an elaborate regime
for monitoring eligibility determinations1 14 and restricting the welfare
rolls." 5 In periods of constriction of welfare benefits, as in the last decade, the media has been flooded with stories about the extent of the fraud
problem. At the same time the government has enacted overextensive
programs of fraud control. 16
Given the inadequacy of AFDC benefit levels 7 and the dollar for
or anyway, they want to be sure that we don't show it .... You simply cannot be honest with white
people." J. GWALTNEY, supra note 110, at 44.
112. For background on the policy debate surrounding welfare fraud control, see J. GARDINER
& T. LYMAN, THE FRAUD CONTROL GAME: STATE RESPONSES TO FRAUD AND ABUSE IN AFDC
AND MEDICAID PROGRAMS (1984).
113. See Pear, "Anecdotes and the Impact They Have Had on Policy", N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1983, at B6, col. 3 (reporting how President Reagan used an anecdote of a Chicago "welfare queen"
which grossly exaggerated the facts of the case to justify his policy of "cracking down" on welfare
fraud, and on welfare eligibility in general).
114. See E. BRODKIN, THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: IMPLEMENTING
QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE (1986).
115. See Zwickel, Providing Effective Representation in Welfare Fraud Cases, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 53 (1981)(condensed by Daniel Taubman)("[Ploor people often suffer unduly when
they are suspected of welfare fraud.... All too often, welfare recipients faced with such threats [of
termination and/or criminal prosecution] agree to leave the public assistance rolls, even though they
remain eligible for assistance. In other instances, recipients sign agreements to repay all benefits
claimed to have been received improperly, without a prior determination that funds were in fact
wrongfully received.").
116. For a discussion of the implementation of fraud sanctions against individuals, see Collin &
Hemmons, Equal ProtectionProblems with Welfare FraudProsecution, 33 LoY. L. REV. 17 (1987).
117. In 1984 the annual combined level of AFDC and Food Stamp payments ranged, in different states, from $10,224 (96.6 percent of the poverty level) to $3,540 (41.8 percent of the poverty
level). The average was 67 percent of the federal poverty level. For a complete breakdown, see
Wickes, 1984 Comparison ofAFDC Payments and Poverty Income Levels, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
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dollar reduction of benefits when a recipient reports work, many welfare
recipients must add other income to their welfare stipends when they
can. 1 18 Furthermore, program rules are so complex and terminations so
frequent and so arbitrary, that few recipients know how much they
should be receiving, or why. t 19 In these circumstances, recipients typically feel themselves vulnerable to fraud charges. A finding of fraud
means suspension from some benefit programs and a very real threat of

jail. 2' Thus "fraud" is a concrete image that focuses Mrs. G.'s diffuse
fear of the welfare office. This threatening image overwhelmed her at one
point, when, distrusting her own lawyer's assurances, she contracted
with the fraud investigator give back the overpayment. But even when

her fear of fraud did not silence her entirely, it counselled her to keep a
"low profile" before the welfare office, asking few questions and making
few demands.

Furthermore, the obsession with fraud in the media and in the eligi962, 67 (1985). Furthermore, in 1970 dollars, the median AFDC payment level has decreased 33
percent from 1970 to 1986. See State Cost of Living Measures and AFDC Payments, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1202 (National Social Science and Law Center, 1987). In 1988, North Carolina's official "need standard" - its official figure for a minimum subsistence income - for a three person
household was $532 per month. Yet the maximum monthly AFDC payment for such a family was
only $288. When the maximum monthly AFDC and Food Stamp payments available to such a
family are combined, the total package is only 65 percent of the federal poverty level. See COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., DATA AND MATERIALS RELATED TO

WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 10 (Comm. Print 1988).
118. In spite of this pressure on recipients to maximize their income, however, the extent of
intentional client misrepresentation in welfare programs is actually quite small. See, e.g., Little, An
Examination of the Data on Welfare Fraud, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1005 (1983)(The government's own review of AFDC cases in 1981 shows that only about 4.7 percent of the cases contained
errors attributed to willful client misrepresentation. Many of these mistakes were probably due to the
client's inability to read program notices.); Collin and Hemmons, supra note 116 (fraud rate in
AFDC program is substantially lower than fraud rate in non-poverty programs).
119. See, Dehavenon, supra note 106; Hirsch, supra note 92; Little, supra note 118.
120. See generally Zwickel, supra note 115. Food Stamp recipients who are determined in an
administrative hearing to have committed an "intentional program violation" are suspended from
the program for six months for the first violation, twelve months for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b) (1989). In the AFDC program, federal law
allows imprisonment for up to a year and a monetary fine for a criminal conviction of fraud. 42
U.S.C. § 1307 (1988). In addition, federal regulations require that the states seek to recoup all overpayments, either through direct client reimbursement or the withholding of future benefits. 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13) (1988). States may terminate recipients who refuse to cooperate with fraud
investigations. See Rush v. Smith, 573 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1978)(approving suspension of AFDC
recipients for refusal to cooperate with fraud investigation, so long as benefits are not also cut off
from their dependent children); 15,844 Welfare Recipients v. King, 474 F.Supp. 1374 (1979)(approving suspension of AFDC recipients who fail to cooperate with a fraud investigation, so long as the
investigation itself is based on legitimate grounds for suspicion). Such sanctions can be disasterous to
persons with no resources. Cf. J. Dollard, supra note 100 (describing how starvation is used in caste
regimes as a method of social control).
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bility process itself, 1 2 1 places a stigma on all welfare recipients. It leads
some to forego welfare altogether."12 And the popular mythology about
welfare recipients-embodied in the Black, jewel-bedecked, Cadillacdriving welfare queen-conveys this negative stereotype to the broader
public. This image- superficially moralistic, but fundamentally racist
and sexist- encourages others to dissociate themselves from the political
interests of welfare recipients.
For a woman like Mrs. G., who does not have the option to forego
welfare, fraud control becomes a constant message that she is not a person worthy of trust. Rather, fraud imagery suggests that she will try at
every moment to cheat the system, to lie. This image resonates with the
ancient stereotype of Woman as liar, 123 as well other negative images of
poor women of color. With these deeply negative images evoked, she begins to doubt her own decisions and her own words."2 4 Thus, the fraud
policy-so defensible on its face-is one of the structures that exacts silence, or self-defeating speech, from Mrs. G.-in the welfare office and at
the hearing. When she is told so clearly, so incessantly, that she is expected to lie, her way of affirming her own dignity is to assume her own
guilt, explaining that "I didn't mean to do anything wrong."'2 5
3. Objectification:The Logic of the Client State. A third local force
that obstructed Mrs. G.'s full participation in the-hearing is the bureaucratic structure of social welfare policy, and indeed, of the legal and
political institutions that create it. This force entered the hearing through
the questions that the advocate put to Mrs. G. The lawyer taught Mrs.
G. to conform her words to the elements of the "lump sum" rule, the
"life necessities" exception, and estoppel. Unlike the other two forceswhich sought to silence Mrs. G. entirely or to undermine the value of her
121. Workers are trained to emphasize fraud at each stage in the application and grant review
process. Claimants are subject to repeated lectures from their workers about fraud, and must sign
forms acknowledging that they have understood these warnings. In addition they must submit third
party verification of virtually all of the information they provide in the application process. These
documentation requirements burden workers as well as clients. The only justification offered to clients for these requirements is to prevent them from committing fraud. These observations are based
on my experience representing AFDC claimants. In addition to my informal contact with eligibility
workers in this role, I also participated in training events for eligibility workers on welfare fraud.
122. See IncreasingHunger and DecliningHelp: Study of Barriersto Participationin the Food
Stamp Program 82 (Physicians' Task Force on Hunger in America, Harvard School of Public Health
1986); Zwickel, supra note 115.
123. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
124. See S.LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974)(describing how the internalization of
oppression is one of the methods by which power is exercised over subordinated persons.)
125.

Cf.THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY, supra note 75.
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speech-this third force dictated the shape that Mrs. G. had to give to
her story-its basic plot and its motivating themes-if she was to be
heard.

Mrs. G.'s persistent feeling about being on welfare was, in her
words, that she was "boxed in." None of the formal rules of welfare set
up boundaries to protect her against churning or retaliation.126 Yet those

rules confined her: they reduced her need to a mathematical formula for
assistance. In all of her dealings with the welfare system-whether she
was filling out forms at the welfare office, answering questions at a hearing, or casting her vote for those with the power to write the rules-Mrs.

G. felt boxed in.
This bureaucratization of welfare was the third force that silenced

Mrs. G. As public regulation of social life has expanded in complex societies, more and more activities have been made compatible with bureaucratic logic. That is, modes of acting-intuitions and customs-have

been "legalized," or reformulated as systems of explicit rules, and values
have been translated into a uniform currency, or "monetized." Bureau-

cracy has been a means for centralized resource allocation and uniform
policy implementation across large, diverse populations. But these apparent "efficiencies" of bureaucracy carry a significant hidden cost: many
social critics argue that the process of bureaucratization has gotten "out
of control" in the regulatory state. Although they use different language,
these critics share the sense that the expanding bureaucratization of modem life threatens to destroy the face to face networks and practices that
we rely on, as human actors, to make sense of our social experience.' 2 7
126. Cf Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 24 (arguing that legal rights might become a
source of protection for subordinate people from invasions of their autonomy and dignity as human
beings). See also, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
127. Among the most powerful of these critics is Jurgen Habermas. See, e.g., 1 J.HABERMAS, A
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcTION (T. McCarthy trans. 1983)(arguing that the "system world"
had exceeded its appropriate boundaries in late welfare capitalism, and penetrates into spheres of life
that must be shaped by intersubjective, communicative processes, in order to maintain their sense).
See also Habermas, Law as Medium and Law as Institution, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 210-11 (G. Teubner ed. 1985)(Bureaucratic implementation requires that concrete
human life histories "be subjected to violent abstraction not merely because [they] have to be subsumed under the law but in order that [they] can be handled administratively." As a result, core
areas of the "life-world" become "separated, through legalized social intervention, from the consensual mechanisms that coordinate action."). See also Fraser, Talking About Needs: Interpretive Con.
tests as PoliticalConflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 ETHIcs 291 (1989); K. Ferguson, supra note
107; Radin, supra note 59 (critiquing the tendency in capitalism to reduce all aspects of life to fungible commodities). Other theorists raise the same set of issues from a different political perspective.
See, eg., Stewart, Madison's Nightmare 11-12 (1989)(unpublished manuscript on file with the author)(describing a growing perception that "the national government.., including the federal administrative bureaucracies .. has overreached itself by attempting to command and control many
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Some of these critics make the stronger argument that in capitalist or
patriarchal societies bureaucracy
becomes a specific vehicle of gender
8
12
and class subordination.

Mrs. G. and her children are among the most vulnerable to this
"pathology" of over-bureaucratization. Because they are stranded by the
1 29
economy, they must depend directly on the state for their subsistence.
To manage the task of maintaining them, the welfare bureaucracy constitutes the terms of their lives in a form, a currency, that it can process. It
equates Mrs. G.'s need with the sum of the stipends the state is willing to
pay her.130 It then contains her anger and her pain by locating those
feelings as symptoms within a de-politicized "self" that psychiatric technologies are developed to manage. 131
Mrs. G. has no role in negotiating the meaning of either her psy-

chiatrically-defined pathologies or her bureaucratically-constructed

"needs." She is excluded on principle from the therapeutic discourse: it
is the experts who had the prerogative to say how her psyche and culture
are defective.1 32 Her status in the conversation about welfare policy is
aspects of economic and social life"). See generally, G. Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299, 305-308 (describing three different theoretical
approaches to the "crisis" of over-bureaucratization in the regulatory state).
128. One "essentialist" version of this argument is that formalist-hierarchical ways of organizing social activities are uniquely repressive to women because of women's caring, interpersonallyfocused gender-identity. See K. FERGUSON, supranote 107. Another version of the claim is that the
ideology and practice of bureaucracy "mask" political decisions as technical problems, and therefore
alienate subordinated persons from their own potential as political actors. See, eg. Frug, supra note
107; Gabel & Harris, supra note 6. Gender is one of the determinants that shape how different
groups experience these injuries.
129. Black men are equally stranded by the economy. See, eg., W. WILSON,THE TRULY DIsADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); YOUNG, BLACK,
AND MALE IN AMERICA: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES (J. Gibbs ed.1988). However, to a large de-

gree, the political system has simply written off their needs altogether. In contrast, for a variety of
historical and ideological reasons, the system responded to pressures in the 1960s and 1970s to
extend survival benefits to single Black women and their children. This expansion is now under
attack, however. See Handler, supra note 102.
130. In the AFDC program, the states are given almost unchecked discretion to set "need standards" for AFDC families that are based on their own fiscal concerns rather than their best estimates
of actual costs of subsistence expenses. See State Cost of Living MeasuresandAFDC Payments,supra
note 117 (comparing the states' official AFDC "need standards" and payment levels with independent cost of living measures). The states are then free to set their AFDC payment levels substantially
below their own need estimates. See Jefferson v. Hackey, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
131. See FRASER, supra note 127. See also Habermas, Law as Medium and Law as Institution,
supra note 127.
132. Cf M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE
OF REASON (R. Howard trans. 1965). For an historical perspective on the ideologies that have defined women's experiences of poverty as a psychiatric or cultural problem, see L. GORDON, HEROES
OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).
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more problematic, however. According to the theory of representative
democracy, she should feel herself a participant in the process that creates welfare policy. When she confronts the "lump sum rule" at her hearing, she should know that her vote gave her at least a virtual hand in
creating that rule. Yet that "knowledge" is not part of her experience.
First of all, racism has kept her community from voting for much of
its history.' 3 3 But Mrs. G.'s exclusion from the formulation of welfare
policy has a deeper source as well. The public discussion of welfareeven among those who have access to the debate-has itself been framed
by a bureaucratic logic. Its broad outlines reinforce deeply rooted moral
judgments about the poor,"' but its details are left to experts-economists and managers-to design. The discourse has become one of costs
and incentives, of crisis containment and systems management, rather
than a search among citizens for the social meanings of their interdependent needs. In this discourse, welfare is defined, at once, as a moral
stigma and a technical problem, rather than an ethical and political challenge to the entire community. In this discussion, Mrs. G.-the primary
target of welfare policy-is not regarded as a speaking being. The talk
she might do-plain, angry, personal,... uncertain-is not accepted as
sensible speech. Rather, she occupies the familiar female position. She is
the Object who is shaped by those with the authority to speak, to reflect
the internal logic of their own systems of power.' 3 5
Feminist scholars are beginning to expose the concrete ways that a
welfare policy that is generated in this bureaucratized discussion has reflected and sustained women's subordination. Mothers' pensions, and
their federalization in the Social Security Act, gave some poor womengenerally from elite social groups-a small measure of economic power
to escape patriarchal households if they so chose.' 36 Yet at the same time
the Social Security Act systematically reinforced the male-headed nuclear family. All of the New Deal welfare programs were infused with
incentives to encourage this family pattern at the expense of egalitarian
133. See Thornburg v. Gingles, supra note 102. For a discussion of the depth of this exclusion of
the poor from majoritarian institutions in our society, see Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality,
30 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1 (1988); K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
134. See Handler, supra note 102; Hasenfeld, Welfare and Work the Institutionalizationof
Moral Ambiguity (1987)(unpublished paper on file with the author).
135. See supra, note 16. See also S. Bowles & H. Gintis, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1986)(discussing generally how the electoral process has become bureaucratized in modem America).
136. See L. GORDON, supra note 132.
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or woman-centered alternatives.1 37 Furthermore, the AFDC program
was unique among New Deal welfare programs in requiring claimants to
open up their sexual lives to the scrutiny and control of welfare workers.1 38 In order to participate in AFDC, Mrs. G. had no choice but to
conform her life to the conditions the program imposed.
At the fair hearing, it was Mrs. G's voice, rather than her behavior,
which was compelled to assent to the bureaucratized-and arguably also
gendered-logic of welfare. The law of evidence--doctrines of relevancy
and materiality-commanded her to keep her speech within the categories that the legislative/administrative process had generated. Even
though the technicalities of evidence law did not apply to her case, the
hearing officer would only attend to the narrow issues that the AFDC
regulations charged him to decide. 139 Was Mrs. G.'s insurance award
covered under the "lump sum" rule? Did Mrs. G.'s expenditures meet
the administrative criteria of "life necessities"? Were the features of estoppel present in the case, and should the doctrine apply? Discrete responses to those questions-that was the measure of "participation" that
this hearing gave to Mrs. G. She best not "fight the questions" if she
wanted her voice to be heard at all."4 Rather, she had to speak her need
137.

For elaboration of this thesis, see, e.g., M. ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF

WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); L. GORDON,

supra note 132, at 108-15; Pearce, The Feminizationof Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, in FOR
CRYING OUT LOUD: WOMEN AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 29-46 (R. Lefkowitz & A.

Withorn eds. 1986). For a study claiming that the AFDC program has supported the nuclear family
norm in its job placement and training policies, see Law, Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy,131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983). See also Working Women on AFDC, 7 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 308 (1984). It should be noted, however, the AFDC program has been widely criticized for forcing two-parent families to split up in order for the children to qualify for benefits.
138. Program features that have been subject to criticism in this regard include the home-visits
that are still often required to verify the absence of one parent, the regulations requiring women to
cooperate in establishing their children's paternity and obtaining child suport orders from absent
fathers, and recent provisions requiring that women apply for benefits for all children in the home.
All of these provisions entail scrutiny into the woman's sexual or intimate choices. See supra note 92.
It should be noted, however, that Joel Handler has persuasively argued that the general relief programs, which have a predominantly male clientele, are typified by equally punitive provisions. But
see Handler, supra note 102. These provisions do not typically entail scrutiny of the sexual lives and
family choices of program participants, however.
139. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-41(a)(1987) provides that in administrative hearings, rules of evidence shall generally be followed, "but when evidence is not reasonably available under such rules to
show relevant facts, they may be shown by the most reliable and substantial evidence available."
Conley and O'Barr observe that even in small claims proceedings, where rules of evidence do not
apply, judges make their decisions on the basis of technically relevant facts, screening out other
aspects of litigants' stories. RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 65.
140. The "silencing" that Mrs. G. experienced from being required to "tell her story" within the
categories imposed by the substantive law is an experience common to litigants from all social and
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as an accounting of how she had spent a few hundred dollars. Within
these constraints, her speech might be worth that sum if she won; it
would have no other consequence.
C.

The Route Taken: Evasive Maneuvers or a Woman's Voice?

If we measure Mrs. G.'s hearing against the norms of procedural
formality, it appears to conform. The hearing appears to invite Mrs. G.
to speak on equal terms with all other persons. Yet within the local landscape of her hearing, Mrs. G.'s voice is constrained by forces that procedural doctrine will neither acknowledge nor oppose. Each of these forces
attaches a specific social cost to her gender and race identity. The caste
system implements race and gender ideology in social arrangements. The
"fraud issue" revives misogynist and racist stereotypes that had been
forced, at least partly, underground by the social movements of the 1960s
and 1970s. And the welfare system responds to gender and race-based
injustice in the economy by constructing the poor as Woman-as an object of social control. Given the power amassed behind these forces, we
might predict that they should win the contest with Mrs. G. for her
voice.
Yet to detect these forces, we have read the story through a structuralist lens, which shows only the stark dichotomy of subordination and
social control.141 It is ironic that this lens, which works so well to expose
the contours of Mrs. G.'s silence, also leaves her-as a woman actively
negotiating the terrain in which she found herself--entirely out of focus.
If we re-center our reading on Mrs. G., as a woman shaping events, unpredictably, to realize her own meanings, we can no longer say with certainty what the outcome will be. We cannot tell who prevailed at the
hearing, or where the power momentarily came to rest. Rather, what we
see is a sequence of surprising moves, a series of questions. Why did Mrs.
G. return to the lawyer after meeting with the fraud investigator to sign a
settlement agreement? Why did she depart from the script she had rehearsed for the hearing, to remain silent before her own worker, and to
ethnic groups, especially those who are most alienated from the legislative process. It is an experience that the most ambitious of the humanist procedural scholars address when they seek institutions that will guarantee meaningful participation opportunities to all citizens. See supra text and
notes 4-6, 127. Cf Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39
(1986)(women law students sometimes "fight" the hypotheticals that they are presented, rather than
respond in the categories dictated by the law). See also C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

66 (1982).

141. See L. Gordon, supra note 132; Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control,
12 FEMINIST STUDIES 453 (1986).
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speak about Sunday shoes? And why did the county finally abandon its
claim to cut her stipend? 4 2
1. Why Did Mrs. G. Return to the Lawyer? The lawyer143 thought
she understood the answer to this question. In her view, Mrs. G.'s life
had taught her that to be safe, she must submit to her superiors. Mrs. G.
was faced with conflicting commands from the welfare agency and the
legal aid office. So, like the archetypical woman, shaped to mold herself
to male desire, 1" Mrs. G. said "yes" to everything the Man asked. She
said yes when the lawyer asked her to go through with a hearing, yes
again when the fraud investigator asked her to drop it, and yes once more
when the lawyer demanded her apology. In the lawyer's view, this excess
of acquiescence had a sad, but straightforward meaning. It marked Mrs.
G.'s lack of social pover: this woman could not risk having a point of
view of her own.
Yet the lawyer was not situated to see the whole story. Though she
aspired to stand beside Mrs. G. as an equal, she also sought to guard her
own status-and the modicum of social power that it gave her. She saw
Mrs. G. as a victim because that was the role she needed her client to
occupy to support her own social status. For if Mrs. G. was indeed silenced by the violence around her, she would then be dependent on the
lawyer's expertise and protection, and therefore compliant to the lawyer's will. With such clients, the lawyer could feel quite secure of her
power, and complacent about the value of her work.
But Mrs. G.'s survival skills were more complex, more subtle, than
the lawyer dared to recognize. There might be another meaning to Mrs.
G.'s ambivalence about what she wanted to do. Perhaps she was playing
with the compliance that all of her superiors demanded. By acquiescing
to both of the system's opposed orders, she was surely protecting herself
from the risks of defiance. But she was also undermining the value-to
them-of her own submission. By refusing to claim any ground as her
142. Just like the inquiry in the previous section, those questions should be addressed, in conversation, to Mrs. G. See supra note 96.
143. As I begin this critique of the lawyer's perspective, I must note the ambiguity of my own
position in this project. As Mrs. G.'s lawyer, I appeared in her story. Yet I also wrote that story, and
I now prepare to read it. The reader should ask what feelings and events I might have left out of the
narrative of Mrs. G. because I was not situated to perceive them. Athough this reading purports to
comment on how the lawyer's viewpoint was limited in the story, my interpretation of the lawyer's
limitations is itself shaped by my own present social location and concerns. What questions does this
reading pose to the story, and what issues does my reading conceal from view?
144. See supra note 16.
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own, she made it impossible for others to subdue her will.' 4 5
Self-negation may not have been the only meaning that Mrs. G. felt
positioned to claim. She finally came back to the lawyer, repudiated the
settlement, determined to pursue her case. Was this merely one more deft
move between two bureaucrats, 146 searching them both for strategic advantage while secretly mocking the rhetoric of both spheres? Or did Mrs.
G. finally get fed up at the unfairness of the welfare, and at her own
endless submission? When she returned to the lawyer, she was offered a
bargain. She might get money, and some limited protection from the welfare, if she went along with the hearing plan. But she might have also
heard the lawyer to promise something different from this quidpro quo.
In her talk of rights and justice, the lawyer offered Mrs. G. not just
money, but also vindication. In going forward with the hearing, was Mrs.
G. simply making a street-wise calculation to play the game the lawyer
offered? Or was she also giving voice to a faint hope-a hope that one
day she might really have the legal protections she needed to take part in
the shaping of justice?14 7
2. Why Did Mrs. G. Depart from her Script? The lawyer had
scripted Mrs. G. as a victim. That was the only strategy for the hearing
that the lawyer, within the constraints of her own social position, could
imagine for Mrs. G. She had warned her client to play the victim if she
wanted to win. Mrs. G. learned her lines. She came to the hearing wellrehearsed in the lawyer's strategy. But in the hearing, she did not play.
When she was cued to perform, without any signal to her lawyer she
abandoned their script.
The lawyer shared with Mrs. G. the oppression of gender, but was
placed above Mrs. G. in the social hierarchies of race and class. The
lawyer was paid by the same people who paid for welfare, the federal
government. Both programs were part of a social agenda of assisting, but
145. See Dalton, supra note 24; Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 24, at 441-443.
146. Legal services lawyers are, after all, functionaries in a government-funded social program.
Sociological studies which investigate this thesis include Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid
Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 474 (1985); Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Personalized orBureaucratizedJustice in Legal Services: Resolving SociologicalAmbivalence in the Delivery
of Legal Aid for the Poor, 9 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 397 (1985); J. KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS IN TRANSITION

(1982).

147. Cf. Left, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1005 (1978)(in exploring the limits of the game
metaphor for legal process, Leff notes "[i]f, however, [adjudication) is not a game, it is not not a
game either. It is ... an amphibian cultural artifact that embodies, simultaneously, at least two
different social mechanisms .... [It] reflects simultaneously the causal and metaphoric universes,
both integral parts of. .. life but neither dominant over the other").
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also controlling, the poor.14 Though the lawyer had worked hard to
identify with Mrs. G., she was also sworn, and paid, to defend the basic
constitution of the status quo. When Mrs. G. "misbehaved" at the hearing, when she failed to talk on cue and then refused to keep quiet, Mrs.
G. pointed to the ambiguity of the legal aid lawyer's social role. Through
her defiant actions, Mrs. G. told the lawyer that a conspiracy with a
double agent is inevitably going to prove an unstable alliance.
The lawyer had tried to "collaborate" with Mrs. G. in devising an
advocacy plan. Yet the terms of that "dialogue" excluded Mrs. G.'s
voice. Mrs. G. was a better strategist than the lawyer-more daring,
more subtle, more fluent-in her own home terrain. She knew the psychology, the culture, and the politics of the white people who controlled
her community. She knew how to read, and sometimes control, her masters' motivations; she had to command this knowledge-this intuitionto survive.14 9 The lawyer had learned intuition as a woman, but in a
much more private sphere. 150 She was an outsider to the county, and to
Mrs. G.'s social world. Mrs. G.'s superior sense of the landscape posed a
subtle threat to the lawyer's expertise. Sensing this threat, the lawyer
steered their strategic "discussion" into the sphere of her own expert
knowledge. By limiting the very definition of "strategy" to the manipulation of legal doctrine, she invited Mrs. G. to respond to her questions
with silence. And, indeed, Mrs. G. did not talk freely when the lawyer
was devising their game-plan. Rather, Mrs. G. waited until the hearing
to act out her own intuitions. Although she surely had not plotted those
actions in advance, she came up with moves at the hearing which threw
everyone else off their guard, and may have proved her the better legal
strategist of the lawyer-client pair.' 51
The disarming "strategy" that Mrs. G. improvised at the hearing
148. Many works trace the history of this contradiction at the core of our society's conception
of welfare. See, eg., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 101; Hasenfeld, supra note 134; J. Katz,
supra note 146.
149. See supra text and notes 22-24. See also Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in
the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987).
150. The behaviors labelled "intuition" are among the strategies that subordinates use to manage an unequal power relationship. See, eg., Snodgrass, Women's Intuition: The Effect of
SubordinateRole on InterpersonalSensitivity, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 146 (1985).
See also supra text and notes 71-73.
151. Some readers have suggested that Mrs. G.'s testimony at the hearing simply shows how
well the adversarial instrument works. They suggest that the ancient trappings of due process, the
formality, the oath, confrontation, urged her, finally, to tell the truth. Her case file noted that the
crucial conversation between herself and her caseworker had taken place, even if the file did not
document this conversation in detail. In the hearing Mrs. G. equivocated about this uncontested
fact. And her children's "everyday" shoes were there at the hearing for everyone to examine. The
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was to appear to abandon strategy entirely. For a moment she stepped
out of the role of the supplicant. She ignored the doctrinal pigeonholes
that would fragment her voice. She put aside all that the lawyer told her
the audience wanted to hear. Instead, when asked to point a finger at her
caseworker, she was silent. When asked about "life necessities," she explained that she had used her money to meet her own needs. She had
bought her children Sunday shoes.
a. Her Silence Before her Caseworker.When the lawyer asked Mrs.
G. about the conversation with her caseworker regarding the insurance
payments, Mrs. G. had nothing to say. The lawyer, smarting from her
own rejection, felt that Mrs. G. was protecting a vulnerable Black sister
with her silence-at her own, and her lawyer's expense. But perhaps
something else was going on. Unlike Mrs. G., the caseworker had earned
self-respect in the system. Mrs. G. and her like- desperately poor, with
no formal schooling, burdened by too many children, "abandoned" by
their men--cast a stigma on this woman because of the common color of
their skin. Did this woman command a different kind of power over Mrs.
G. than the white masters-a power that felt like shame, rather than
fear? Perhaps Mrs. G. was not willing to flaunt her own degradation
before this woman, as the lawyer demanded.15 2 Perhaps she was not willing to grovel-pointing fingers, showing off tattered shoes, listing each of
her petty expenses-before this distant, disapproving sister. Perhaps Mrs.
G.'s silence before this other Black woman, and her talk about Sunday
shoes, expressed a demand-and an affirmation-of her own dignity.
b. Her Talk about Sunday Shoes. When Mrs. G. talked about Sunday shoes, she was talking about a life necessity. For subordinated communities, physical necessities do not meet the minimum requirements for
a human life. Rather, subordinated groups must create cultural practices
through which they can elaborate an autonomous, oppositional consciousness. Without shared rituals for sustaining their survival and motivating their resistance, subordinated groups run the risk of total
domination-of losing the will to use their human powers to subvert
their oppressor's control over them. Religion, spirituality, the social institution of the Black Church, has been one such self-affirming cultural
question of whether she needed to replace them was not a simple question of reconstructing the
historical record.
152. This discussion does not imply that the social worker's imagined judgment of Mrs. G. is
fair. Rather, it suggests that Mrs. G. made her statement at the hearing in the context of the complex
relationship between these two women, a relationship that none of the other actors had access to.
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practice for the communities of African American slaves, and remains
central to the expression of Black identity and group consciousness today. By naming Sunday shoes as a life necessity, Mrs. G. was speaking to
the importance of this cultural practice in her life, a truth that the system's categories did not comprehend.
At the same time that Mrs. G.'s statement affirmed the church, it
condemned the welfare system. By rejecting the welfare's definition of life
necessities,15 3 she asserted her need to have a say about the criteriafor
identifying her needs. Her statement was a demand for meaningful participation in the political conversations in which her needs are contested
and defined.154 In the present welfare system, poor women-the objects
of welfare-are structurally excluded from those conversations. 55 When
Mrs. G. insisted on her need to say for herself what her "life necessities"
might be, she expanded, for a moment, the accepted boundaries of those
conversations.
Mrs. G.'s statement also spoke to a third dimension of her "life necessity." When Mrs. G. talked about buying Sunday shoes, she defied the
rules of legal rhetoric-the rule of relevancy, the rule against "rambling," 1 56 the unwritten rule that told her to speak like a victim if she
wanted to win. 57 Had Mrs. G. spoken the language that was proper for
her in the setting, her relevant, logical, submissive, hyper-correct responses to their questions might have been comprehended. But, by dutifully speaking the language of an institution from which subordinated
groups have historically been excluded and in which Mrs. G. felt herself
to have no stake, her voice would have repeated, and legitimated, the
very social and cultural patterns and priorities that had kept her down.
Had she been a respectful participant in the legal ritual, Mrs. G. would
have articulated someone else's need, or pleasure, rather than her own.
Mrs. G. did not boycott the hearing altogether. Rather, in her moment of misbehavior, she may have been standing her ground within it.
Although she appeared, at first, to be deferring to the system's categories
and rules, when she finally spoke, she animated those categories with her
own experience. 158 She stretched the category of "life necessity" to express her own values, and turned it around to critique the welfare's sys153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra note 87.
See Fraser, supra note 127.
See supra notes 126-140 and accompanying text.
See O'Barr & Conley, Rules versus Relationships,supra note 65.
See Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 24.
See M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION (C. Emerson & M. Holquist trans. 1981).
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temic disregard of her own point of view. By talking about Sunday shoes,
Mrs. G. claimed, for one fragile moment, what was perhaps her most
basic "life necessity." She claimed a position of equality in the speech
community-an equal power to take part in the making of language, the
making of shared categories, norms, and instituions-as she spoke
through that language about her needs.
When Mrs. G. claimed this power, she affirmed the feminist insight
that the dominant languages do not construct a closed system, from
which there can be no escape. 5 9 Although dominant groups may control
the social institutions that regulate these languages, those groups cannot
control the capacity of subordinated peoples to speak. Thus, women have
evaded complete domination through theirpractice of speaking, like Mrs.
G. spoke at her hearing, from their own intuitions and their own experi-,
ence. Feminist writers have drawn three figures-play, archaeology, and
60
poetry-to describe this emancipatory language practice.'
159. This critique is developed in A. JARDINE, GYNESIS: CONFIGURATIONS OF WOMEN AND
MODERNITY (1985). See also supra notes 16 & 23.
160. The figure of play connotes an exuberant, unruly approach toward conventions of discourse which can disarm an oppressive language-system, reanimating it with women's experiences.
Patricia Yaeger elaborates in HONEY-MAD WOMAN, supra note 23, at 18:
[P]layfulness and word play are very much at issue in the woman writer's reinvention of
her culture ....
[P]lay itself is a form of aesthetic activity in which ... what has been
burdensome becomes - at least momentarily - weightless, transformable, transformative. As women play with old texts, the burden of the tradition is lightened and shifted; it
has the potential for being remade.
The figure of archaeology refers to the collective searching of private memories and the shared
past to uncover the suppressed meanings that are latent in familiar words. Mary Daly invokes archaeology in GYN/ECOLOGY (1978) at 24 when she describes how, in her writing, she searches for
the hidden powers of words:
Often I unmask deceptive words by dividing them and employing alternate meanings for
prefixes .... I also unmask their hidden reversals, often by using less known or "obsolete" meanings .... Sometimes I simply invite the reader to listen to words in a different
way .... When I play with words I do this attentively, deeply, paying attention to etymology, to varied dimensions of meaning, to deep Background meanings and subliminal
associations.
The third figure that guides this emancipatory language practice is poetry - coaxing the language just beyond its systemic boundaries, toward images and understandings that both expand, and
challenge, its rule. Used in this sense, poetry is closely connected to consciousness raising - the
feminist method in which women, through their practice of talking together about their own experience, create the common language which makes that talking possible. See T. DE LAURETIS, ALICE
DOESN'T: FEMINISM, SEMIOTICS, CINEMA (1984) (defining consciousness raising as "the collective
articulation of one's experience of sexuality and gender ... [which] has produced, and continues to
elaborate, a radically new mode of understanding the subject's relation to social-historical reality.
Consciousness raising is the original critical instrument that women developed toward such understanding, the analysis of social reality and its critical revision"). Consciousness raising places new
demands on the language because, through it, women grope to share feelings that have previously
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When Mrs. G. construed "life necessities" to include Sunday shoes,
she turned the hearing into a place where she could talk, on a par with
the experts, about her "needs." For a moment she defied the rigid official
meaning of necessity, and refused to leave nameless the values and passions that gave sense to her life. Adrienne Rich describes the process:
For many women, the commonest words are having to be sifted through,
rejected, laid aside for a long time, or turned to the light for new colors and
flashes of meaning: power, love, control, violence, political, personal, private, friendship, community, sexual, work, pain, pleasure, self, integrity
.... When we become acutely, disturbingly aware of the language we are
using and that is using us, we begin to grasp a material resource that women have never before collectively attempted to repossess....161
Mrs. G. might want to add "participation" and "need" to the poet's list.
3. How Was Mrs. G. s Voice Heard? The third question that the
story raises is the ending. The story tells us that the hearing officer ruled
against Mrs. G., and then the county welfare department decided to drop
the case, restoring her full stipend. But the text does not say how the men
across the table experienced the hearing, or why the county eventually
gave in. Did Mrs. G.'s paradoxical "strategy" disarm her audience? Did
she draw a response from her audience that was different-more compelling-than the pity that her lawyer had wanted to play upon? Did her
presentation of herself as an independent, church-going woman, who
would exercise her own judgment, and was willing to say what she
needed-did these qualities make the men fear her, respect her, regard
her for a moment as a person, rather than a case? Did they feel a moment
of anger-about the ultimately powerless roles that they were assigned to
play in the bureaucracy that regulated all of their lives? Were these men
moved, by the hearing, to snatch her case from the computer and subject
it to their own human judgment? If this is indeed what happened-and
we do not know-would Mrs. G., in retrospect, have wished the story to
end that way? Or was this moment of benign discretion a double-edged
precedent-more dangerous to her people than the computer's reliable
indifference?
gone unnamed. When those feelings find words, poetry is produced. As Audre Lorde expresses the
matter in her essay, Poetry is Not a Luxury:
We can train ourselves to respect our feelings and to transpose them into a language so
they can be shared. And where that language does not yet exist, it is our poetry which
helps to fashion it.
See A. LORDE, SIsTER OUTSIDER 37-38 (1984).
161. A. RICH, Power and Danger:Works of a Common Woman, in ON LIES, SECRETS, SILENCE
247 (1977).
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We do not know why the county decided to drop Mrs. G.'s case.
What we do know, however, is that after the hearing Mrs. G. remained a
Black, single mother on welfare-poor, dependent, despised.162 Mrs. G.'s
unruly participation at her hearing was itself political action.1 63 Yet it
was an act that did little to change the harsh landscape which constricts
Mrs. G. from more sustained and more effective political participation.
Substantial change in that landscape will come only as such fragile moments of dignity are supported and validated by the law. It is on that
possibility that the essay concludes.
III.

WHAT KIND OF PROCESS FOR MRS. G.?

Like all stories, the story of Mrs. G. is ambiguous. The only clear
lesson that it teaches is negative: removing formal barriers to participation is not enough in our stratified society to achieve procedural justice,
even in the modest sense of enabling all persons to participate in the
rituals of their self-government on an equal basis.' Although Mrs. G.
finally "won" her hearing, it was a fragile victory, more attributable to
the mysteries of human character than to the rule of law. Even after that
victory, she was still obstructed from meaningful participation 65 in her
162. Perhaps by collaborating more fully with Mrs. G. as we theorize about her, we could better
comprehend the "doubleness" of her subordination - her power and her pain - without being
caught between the inadequate paradigms of structural determinism on the one hand and unfettered
human agency on the other. Cf supra notes 59, 96 & 141.
163. For an elaboration of the idea that expressive activity should be understood, in our civic
culture, as politically meaningful action, see Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression
and the Subordination of Groups (1989)(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
164. Throughout this essay and most explicitly in this section, I speak toward an "horizon" of
procedural justice that would entail the meaningful participation of all citizens in both legislative and
adjudicative spheres. See supra text and notes 2-6. The legislative and adjudicative spheres are, of
course, structurally and normatively separated in current constitutional discourse. We have been
taught to assume without question that the constitution should mandate an impermeable wall between the legislature and the courts. And we accept that "due process" has been properly parsed into
separate "substantive" and "procedural" doctrines that set different minima for legitimacy - legislative rationalityand adjudicative regularity- in the two spheres. It is beyond the scope of this essay
to elaborate a feminist critique of either the normative bifurcation of "due process" into substance
and procedure, or the structural separation of powers to which those norms correspond. Jurgen
Habermas addresses the normative question in his theory of communicative rationality. See J.
HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1988)(claiming that a deep form of
procedural regularity - which assures direct, unencumbered, and equal participation of all speakers
- will ensure the rational elaboration of social norms). And Martha Minow has begun a feminist
critique and reformulation of the structural doctrine of separation of powers. See M. MINOW, Separation of Powers, Powers in Relationships, in MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (forthcoming)(critiquing and reformulating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers from a feminist
perspective).
165. My use of this term throughout the essay presumes a moral and political theory through
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own self-governance-not by overt legal barriers, but by deeply rooted
conditions of social inequality. Is it asking too much of our Constitution 166 to enlist its normative authority to challenge those conditions?
Goldberg v. Kelly speaks, in its margins, to this unsettling possibility. The
majority opinion quotes an article which observes that "the prosecution
of a [welfare] appeal demands a degree of security, awareness, tenacity,
and ability which few dependent people have." 167 The opinion also
states that "[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capaci-

ties and circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 168 What would it

mean to tailor procedures to take account of the "insecurity" that gets in
the way when Mrs. G., and other "dependent" people seek to be heard?
It is far beyond the scope of this essay-indeed, it may be beyond the
scope of the possible-to provide a definitive answer to that question.
Instead, in closing, I will return to the three local forces that obstructed
Mrs. G.'s participation. I will point toward a few themes that Mrs. G.

might herself suggest for countering those forces.
A.

Challenging the Grounds of Intimidation

Perhaps the greatest barrier to Mrs. G.'s participation is her wellfounded fear of retaliation. A substantial first step toward countering this
barrier was taken when- legal representation was made available to her. 169
which we can distinguish between "meaningful" or "authentic" and "distorted" or "inauthentic"
participation. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129
(1986)(discussing possible normative grounds for the law's interference with the expressed preferences of individual citizens). Habermas' theory of communicative action provides a powerful possibility, particularly if the insights of his feminist critics are also taken into account. See J. HABERMAS,
supra notes 127 & 164. But see Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Theory of Ethics, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 291 (1985); Fraser, What's Criticalabout Critical Theory? The Case ofHabermasand Gender, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 31-55 (1987)(showing

how

Habermas presumes the basic social structures of patriarchy in his theory of "life worlds"); Young,
Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political
Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE 56, 67-73 (critiquing Habermas' vision of communicative rationality for its failure to take account of the opacity of language and the irreducible heterogeneity of any
speech community).
166. My use of the term "constitution" is informed by the work of Frank Michelman and Kenneth Karst. See Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supranote 5 (identifying a repressed "republican" normative vision in our constitutional tradition); K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra
note 133.
167. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 2, at 269 & n. 16, citing to Wedermeyer & Moore, The
American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 342 (1966).
168. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 2, at 253-54.
169. The Goldberg opinion itself acknowledged the importance of legal representation to any
system of procedural protections for the poor. See supra note 2, at 270, quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (.'The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be'heard by counsel."). Unfortunately, however, access to legal counsel by
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Without skilled advocates, poor people cannot invoke the laws that already forbid intentional retaliation.1 70 But even with access to lawyers,
subordinated groups would need stronger and more sensitive laws to give
them any real protection against the threat of retaliation. The penalties
against retaliation must be increased, and the enforcement mechanisms

simplified. The definition of retaliation and the methods of proof must be
designed from the claimant's, rather than the perpetrator's point of
view. 7 1 And the claimant must be shielded from the risk of further retaliation for seeking relief.
In order to feel safe to speak out at a hearing, however, Mrs. G.
needs more than post hoc remedies against overt acts of retaliation. She
also needs to feel economically secure, economically independent. She

needs to feel confident enough of her future that threats of economic
punishment will have no bite. The social policies that might create such
conditions are vigorously contested, and the political will that might enact them is not apparent. Without such economic security, however, post

hoc measures to deter retaliation will never fully dismantle the barrier
that intimidation imposes to her speech. For as long as Mrs. G. remains

dependent on the pleasure of her masters for her next meal, she will continue to plot her words-and her silences-to speak their will, rather
than hers.
the poor has been undermined by recent Supreme Court decisions. See Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)(holding that the federal Constitution does not
require states to guarantee counsel to indigent defendants in all proceeding to terminate parental
rights); Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)(upholding a
statutory limit often dollars on attorneys' fees to lawyers representing veterans at benefit hearings).
Access to counsel in civil contexts has also been undermined by federal funding cuts to the Legal
Services Corporation, which had never been funded sufficiently to give all segments of the poverty
population access to legal representation.
Although access to counsel is a crucial measure for equalizing participation opportunities across
class differences, the story of Mrs. G. demonstrates that lawyers can reduplicate, rather than reduce,
speech barriers linked to inequities of social power. Nevertheless, if the law offered more adequate
protections against retaliation, and lawyers were self-reflective about the power relations between
themselves and their clients, legal representation could substantially increase Mrs. G.'s security
about raising her voice. This would be especially true if Mrs. G. had a more immediate involvement
in the "legislative" decisions that shape her life.
170. The First Amendment, state statutes, and tort law all provide doctrinal remedies against
retaliation. However, in all three areas, the protections have limited effect because of the plaintiffs
burden of proving the defendant's retaliatory motivation, and the wide range of defenses that are
available to negate the retaliation claim. See 40 A.L.R 3d 753 (1971); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F. 2d
687, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968).
171. Theoretical work by feminist scholars on legal remedies for battered women can provide
some guidance on doctrinal innovations that might surmount these problems. See, e.g., Littleton,
supra note 59.
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Challenging the Imagery that Sustains Subordination

The second force that impedes Mrs. G.'s participation is negative
cultural imagery of gender, race, and class. This imagery dwells in the
minds of her superiors. But it is also through these images that Mrs. G.
understands herself, and learns to undermine her own voice. Mrs. G. was
under the sway of these negative images when she repeatedly apologized
to her lawyer for doing something wrong. These internalized images also
led Mrs. G. to use "powerless" language at her hearing, language that
might deflect overt violence, but at the expense of confirming her subordination. It is not easy to imagine mechanisms to protect Mrs. G. from
the negative stereotypes that pervade the culture and distort her speech.
As a first step, lawyers and judges can be educated about the risk
that race- and gender-linked speech habits will impact on credibility assessment. William O'Barr suggests that lawyers might coach witnesses to
use socially dominant modes of speech. Judges might intervene during
hearings to restate the testimony of "powerless" speakers. In cases where
the social gap between witness and factfinder is extreme, the law might
guarantee interpreters, or require corrective jury instructions, or even
amend evidence rules to address the subtle distortions that dialect differences are likely to cause.172 Bennett and Feldman suggest the use of expert witnesses to educate juries about the risk that they might discredit
testimony because of social barriers encoded into a witness's speech. 173
We could go beyond such educational measures, to require that the factfinder share the perspective' 7 4 -the social location17 5 --of the claimant,
particularly in a context like welfare hearings where the claimant is likely
to come from a marginalized social group.176 All such proposals would
172. See Conley, O'Barr & Lind, supra note 61, at 1395-99, for speculation about how this
proposal might work in the courtroom. There is a problem, of course, that such a remedy might
itself exacerbate the perceived status difference between the witness and her audience.
173. See W. Bennet & M. Feldman, supra note 69, at 179. Experts might also work behind the
scenes, helping lawyers take account of language and cultural barriers in preparing their cases, or
providing the court with guidance on the venue issue or the jury selection process.
174. See Resnik, On the Bias FeministReconsiderationsofthe Aspirationsfor our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988)(critiquing the norm of judicial neutrality in light of feminist theories).
175. This might mean sharing demographic characteristics such as class, race, ethnicity, gender,
age, disability, or sexual orientation. It might mean sharing membership in a localized geographic
community, such as a housing project or a neighborhood. Alternatively, it might mean sharing an
identity as "clients" in a particular social program, such as AFDC or a public school.
176. Cf Resnik, supra note 174. Such a requirement would expand the currently evolving constitutional doctrine ofjury selection. In its present form, this doctrine is framed negatively: it prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike minority jurors because of race. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See also Goldwasser, Limiting a CriminalDefendant's Use
ofPeremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Use of the Jury in a CriminalTrial, 102 HARV. L.
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run an obvious risk, however, of deepening the already profound chasms
in perspective between dominant and subordinated social groups in this

society.

177
A more ambitious reform agenda would expand the logic of proof
so that the conversational and narrative styles of subordinated groups are
no longer deemed "irrelevant" to the decision process. 178 Uncertain,
Other-oriented speech might be revalued in legal rituals that seek to

build community rather than punish the transgression of legal rules. Informal processes carry serious risks in the welfare context, however,
where the power difference between the individual claimant and the gov-

ernment is so great.
Even if any of these reforms could be implemented, however, none

would address the hardest question that racist and gendered cultural imagery poses. Are the images themselves so central to Mrs. G.'s subordination that the law should challenge those images directly, even at the

risk of silencing or chilling speech? This question has erupted into bitter
political controversy within subordinated communities 179 and impas-

sioned debates among constitutional scholars. 181 We may wish to avoid
REv. 808 (1989). An affirmative requirement that a significant part of each jury share the race,
gender, and class background of the claimant would reach beyond current doctrine.
177. In his classic discussion of adjudication, Lon Fuller describes it as a ritual of participation
in which troubles must be converted into bipolar claims of right or accusations of fault in order to be
heard. See Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 369 (1978)("Adjudication... consists in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments. The litigant must
therefore, if his participation is to be meaningful, assert some principle or principles by which his
arguments are sound and his proofs relevant. A naked demand... [or] a mere expression of displeasure or resentment [is not sufficient to warrant relief]").
178. For speculation on how such reform might reshape our adversarial lawyering process, see
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 140.
179. Among feminists, this controversy has focused on a movement seeking passage of an ordinance that would make the proliferation of pornographic images actionable as gender discrimination. A version of this ordinance was enacted in Minneapolis and subsequently declared
unconstitutional by the courts. See American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), afl'd without hearing, 106 S.Ct. 1172 (1986). A parallel controversy has recently
erupted at colleges which have taken action to quell an epidemic of racist speech among students.
See, eg., Worthington, University of Wisconsin Regents Move to Rein in Racism, Chicago Tribune,
April 12, 1989, at 1, Zone C; F. Barringer, Free Speech and Insults on Campus, New York Times,
April 25, 1989, at Al, All (constitutional law professor Gerald Gunther compares an anti-race
harassment proposal at Stanford University to feminist efforts to restrict pornography).
180. Some theorists claim that in a gendered society, the "speech" that we risk silencing in
pornographic images is a method of domination, and unworthy of protection under our political
norm of free expression. See, e-g., C. MACKINNON, supranote 8, at 206-214. Others rejoin that there
is no principled basis for distinguishing pornography from the "abnormal" modes of expression that
subordinated groups must employ to challenge dominant discourses. See, e.g., K. KARST, supra note
133, at 54-70.
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getting caught up in this debate. But if we take Mrs. G.'s experience
seriously, the law's appropriate response to racist imagery marks an empirical, strategic, and normative conundrum that we cannot avoid.
C. Confining Bureaucracy
Beyond the obvious injustice imposed by racism and gender looms
the much more complex obstacle posed to the participation of all citizens
by a structural momentum I have called bureaucracy. To dismantle the
bureaucratic barrier-to imagine an alternative template for the organization of complex, "post-industrial" institutions-entails a much more
daring reconstructive project than simply to realize the promise of formal
equality. Can we reimagine the economy as a network of face to face
deliberations, among citizens, about the production and allocation of social wealth? Can we reimagine our mature, liberated selves as interdependent beings, rather than lonely souls embattled by the selfish demands of
others? And as women, weary from incessant connectedness, do we even
want to?
Neither the answers to those questions, nor the project of creating
post-bureaucratic institution, are easy. Such institutions will be neither
feasible nor desirable in every domain of social life. Their creation cannot
be driven by ideological presuppositions about what the future should be;
indeed, misguided leaps forward have proved disastrous. Rather, the relocation of bureaucratized governance in participatory institutions must
proceed cautiously, experimentally, guided by local knowledge rather
than grand design. In diverse locales, gradual steps toward new institutional forms--democratic experiments in the workplace, in housing, in
education, and in the community-are under way.
Perhaps a second "constitutional revolution" will eventually map
these changes onto the charter of our government, superseding the
bureaucratized normative vision of the New Deal regulatory state by a
less holistic vision of power.1 81 Such a transformation must receive substantial support from the state, through reforms that protect against race
and gender bias and reduce the risk of retaliation when poor people dare
to speak out. Reforms that will dismantle the barriers to Mrs. G.'s political participation. But beyond that crucial economic and cultural sup181. See Sunstein, Constitutionalismafter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987)(describing the constitutional revolution of the New Deal era, which replaced a privatized liberal normative
vision of our constitutional democracy with a norm of centralized, interventionist, bureaucratic governance). See also R. CRANSTON, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 101-273 (1985);
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 127.
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port, the shape of post-bureaucratic institutions will not come from the
traditional architects of the law. It will come instead from the diverse,
localized institution-building activities that poor Black single women
with children-citizens-undertake for themselves, on their own ground.

